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ABSTRACT 
DIVIDEND POLICY OF U.S. OWNED 
FOREIGN SUBSIDIARIES 
September 1985 
i 
KEONWOO KIM 
B.B.A. Seoul National University, Korea 
M.B.A. Seoul National University, Korea 
Ph.D. University of Massachusetts 
Directed by Professor Joseph E. Finnerty 
The purpose of this study is to identify models of 
behavior which explain the dividend policy of U.S. owned 
foreign subsidiaries from 1964 to 1982. Dividend payment 
behavior of U.S. corporations was first explained by 
Lintner (1956) who found that the dividends depend in 
part on the firm's current earnings and in part on the 
past dividends. The question of interest is: Can 
Lintner's model explain repatriation of earnings from 
U.S. owned foreign subsidiaries to their U.S. parent? 
The study was done in three phases. In phase one 7 
tests were done in order to ascertain dividend payment 
behavior regarding the U.S. parent companies and their 
foreign subsidiaries. The results of the tests showed 
that the U.S. owned foreign subsidiaries had more stable 
dividend payment records than their U.S. parent 
vn 
companies. Also, they did not follow their U.S. parent 
companies' dividend payout policy. 
In phase two Lintner's partial adjustment model was 
extended to explain dividend payment behavior of the U.S. 
owned foreign subsidiaries. The study examined whether 
Lintner's model was misspecified, or if the explanatory 
power of Lintner's model must be specified under 
different regimes, i.e., fixed versus floating exchange 
rates. Lintner's model was found to have different 
explanatory power under fixed and floating exchange 
rates. 
The third phase focused on the effect of exchange 
rates, interest rates, and inflation rates in Canada and 
the U.S. in explaining the dividend policy of the U.S. 
owned Canadian subsidiaries. This was accomplished by 
extending or modifying Lintner's partial adjustment 
model. The results obtained did not support the 
hypothesis that the exchange rates are important in 
explaining the dividend policy of the U.S. owned Canadian 
subsidiaries. However, Canadian interest rates were 
found to be important and could enter into Lintner's 
model to better explain the dividend payment behavior of 
U.S. owned Canadian subsidiaries. 
• • • 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Multinational corporations (here after MNCs) are 
playing a greater role in world trade. 1 One of the 
characteristics of the multinational corporation is that 
it involves the allocation of resources among 
countries. It is an international conduit not only 
for the financial flows ^ but also for the transfer of 
raw materials, semifinished and finished consumer goods, 
capital goods, labor services, and technological 
know-how. These packages of transactions tend to confer 
greater monopoly power than do single transactions. The 
ability to take advantage of these intracorporate global 
transactions is potentially advantageous to the MNC. 
In the multinational financial system, MNCs have 
greater control over the mode and timing of the financial 
transfers than do domestic firms. For example, funds can 
be moved from one unit to another by adjusting the 
transfer prices on intracorporate sales and purchases of 
goods and services. Capital may be sent overseas as debt 
or equity depending on such factors as interest rates. 
1 
2 
currency denomination, and official reserves positions. 
In summary, the channels (techniques) available to 
the MNC for moving funds or profits internationally 
include : 
A) Transfer prices, 4 B) Reinvoicing centers, 5 C) 
Fees and royalties, D) Leading and lagging, 6 E) 
7 
Intracorporate loans, F) Shifting compensating 
o 
balance, G) Dividends, H) Debt versus equity 
9 10 
investment, and I) Choice of invoicing currency. 
Dividends are probably the most common method by 
which multinational corporations cause funds to be 
transferred from foreign affiliates to parent company. 
It is arguably the most straightforward and the most in 
keeping with the traditional concepts of corporate 
ownership. 
The aim of this study is to identify models of 
behavior which explain the dividend policy of U.S. owned 
foreign subsidiaries from 1964 to 1982. Specifically, 
this study is focused on the intracompany dividend 
payment behavior from U.S. owned Canadian subsidiaries to 
their U.S. parent companies. The dividend payment 
behavior within a multinational corporate organization 
may be different from the dividend payment behavior 
between the corporate organization and the financial 
markets. The basic differences of intracompany dividend 
policy from a domestic company's dividend policy are : 
first, dividends from foreign subsidiaries to parent 
company are not direct disbursement to the individual 
stockholders; second, dividends are received in terms of 
foreign currency hence an extra risk factor is attached 
to the repatriated dividends; third, the dividend payment 
on the market literature is more concerned with market 
reactions to the stock price resulting from the dividend 
payment variations. The intracompany dividend payment 
literature emphasizes the agreement that this payment is 
a necessary and legitimate business expense. 
Intracompany dividends are paid every period to 
demonstrate a continuing policy to the local government 
and central bank. Some multinational companies even set 
a uniform dividend payout ratio throughout the corporate 
system to set a global pattern and maintain the principle 
that the subsidiaries have an obligation to pay dividends 
to their corporate stockholders. As a result, 
intracompany dividends have a more stable record of 
payments than dividends to the markets. Further, the 
complexity of factors which influence the multinational 
form of organization would appear to have a direct 
bearing on the choice of dividend policy depending on the 
current conditions in the world. 
CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
II-l Business Literature on Dividend Policy 
Dividend policy is one of the most important policy 
decisions in financial management. A dividend decision 
is closely related to a firm's financing decision because 
every dollar paid out in dividends is a dollar less 
available to satisfy the financing requirements of the 
firm's operations. If dividend policy were strictly a 
financing decision, however, there would be no need to 
treat it separately. One reason it is addressed 
separately is a belief that dividends may represent more 
than a residual decision. They may affect the value of 
the firm apart from the financing decision. 
For a company with a large growth potential, there 
is typically a need to finance externally. This is true 
for the firm as a whole or for each individual component 
of the firm. The equity base of the firm or of the 
individual component must be built either through 
retention of earnings, the sale of common stock, or the 
sale of additional debt. Because of floatation costs. 
4 
5 
the retention of earning is usually "cheaper". This 
argues for a lower dividend payout ratio. For a slowly 
growing firm, there is frequently a lack of suitable 
investments, so external equity and/or debt needs are 
relatively low. Given this situation, the firm may be 
justified in paying out a higher proportion of its 
earnings. 
The intracompany dividend policy may affect the 
firm's tax payments and in the case of the U.S. firm it 
may affect the taxes paid by its shareholders. Dividends 
received by the taxable investor may be taxed as ordinary 
income, whereas capital gains on shares held for more 
than one year are taxed at a preferential rate. In the 
case of the tax exempt investors, there may be other 
reasons for the dividend preference. H 
When managers decide on the dividend payment, their 
primary concerns seem to be to give shareholders a 
reasonable level of dividends. It is believed that most 
managers have a conscious or subconcious long-term target 
payout rate. However, if firms simply applied the 
target payout rate to each year's earnings, dividends 
could fluctuate widely. In order to avoid these wide 
fluctuations in dividends, managers try to smooth 
dividend payments by moving only partway toward the 
target payout in a given year. Past years' earnings as 
6 
well as expected future performance are taken into 
consideration when they set the dividend payments. If 
investors are aware of this behavior they will tend to 
view a large dividend increase as a sign of optimism and 
a cut in dividends as a sign that the management has 
modest expectations of future performance. 
It has been well established that the sudden shifts 
in dividend policy can cause abrupt changes in stock 
13 
price. A principal reason is the information that 
investors read into the company's action. Given such 
market expectations and reactions, there is a clear case 
for defining the firm's target payout and making 
relatively slow adjustment toward it over time. If it is 
necessary to make a sharp increase or decrease in the 
dividend payment, the company should provide as much 
forewarning as possible and take considerable care to 
ensure that the action is not misinterpreted. 
Subject to these conditions, a company should adopt 
a target payout ratio that is sufficiently low so as to 
minimize future variations in the level of dividends. In 
addition, the target payout ratio should be set in 
consonance with growth expectations and related need« for 
capital investment or possibly the repurchase of stock. 
If we hold the company's investment policy constant, then 
the dividend policy is a trade-off between the cash 
7 
dividends and the issue or repurchase of common stock. 
A common - though not universal - view is that 
higher dividend payment will cause higher share price. 
There is a natural clientele for the high dividend 
payment stocks. But given the market imperfections where 
the tax rate on dividends is higher than on capital 
gains, investors would require a higher before tax return 
on high-payout stocks to compensate for their tax 
disadvantage. High-income investors would tend to 
gravitate toward the low-payout ratio firms. This view 
is called the clientele effect. However, clientele 
theory (view) is silent on the question why some firms 
continue to distribute such large sums contrary to the 
preference of investors. 
The theories on the dividend payment behavior are 
categorized in TABLE 1 and examined as follows. 
8 
TABLE 1 
OVERVIEW OF CORPORATE DIVIDEND THEORY 
IRRELEVANCY THEORY 
Because of : 
Homemade Dividends 
Residual Theory of Dividends 
Clientele Effects 
Modigliani and Miller (1961) 
Higgins (1972) 
Black and Scholes (1974) 
Miller and Scholes (1978, 82) 
(Clientele Effects) 
Elton and Gruber (1970) 
Pettit (1977) 
Kwan (1981) 
RELEVANCY THEORY 
0% Payout Bias 
Because of : 
Two-Birds-In-Bush Arguement 
Lower Capital Gain Tax Rates 
Floatation Costs in Issuing New Stocks 
Farrer and Sewlyen (1967) 
Brennan (1970) 
Litzenberger & Ramaswamy (1979,80,82) 
100% Payout Bias 
Because of : 
One-Bird-In-Hand Arguement 
Transaction Costs in Buying and Selling Shares 
Institutional Demand 
Graham and Dodd (1951) 
Gordon (1959) 
OPTIMUM DIVIDEND THEORY 
Because of : 
Information Effect on Stock Price 
Signalling Effect on Stock Price 
Agency Theory 
Pettit (1972) 
Watts (1973) 
Ross (1977) 
Bhattacharya (1979) 
Rozeff (1982) 
9 
TABLE 1, cont. 
STOCK REPURCHASE THEORY 
Because of : 
The Information or Signalling Hypothesis 
Leverage Hypothesis 
Dividend Tax Avoidance Hypothesis 
Bondholder Expropriation Hypothesis 
Wealth Transfers among Shareholders 
Masulis (1980) 
Vermaelen (1981) 
Dann (1981) 
HISTORICAL DIVIDEND PAYMENT MODEL OF BEHAVIOR 
Dividends to the market 
Lintner (1956) (period 1918-1941) 
Brittain (1966) (period 1942-1960) 
Fama & Babiak (1968) (period 1946-1964) 
Djarraya (1980) (period 1962-1978) 
Intracompany Dividends 
Zenoff (1966) 
Kopits (1971) 
Robbins & Stobaugh (1973) 
Ness (1975) 
Horst (1977) 
Mutti (1981) 
10 
(1) IRRELEVANCY THEORY 
In theory, according to Miller and Modigliani (MM), 
the value of a firm is determined solely by the firm's 
investments. Dividend payouts are a detail of the firm's 
given investment policy and do not directly influence the 
firm's market value. 
MM argue that investors are (or should be) 
indifferent to the payment of dividends because dividends 
are irrelevant to the value of the firm. This 
irrelevancy (or indifference) theory holds that if the 
firm pays no dividends, the stockholder may create 
"homemade" dividends by selling a portion of the stocks 
held, or if the firm paid out all earnings in dividends, 
the stockholder could use the dividends to purchase 
additional shares. Thus, the value can be neither 
created nor destroyed through dividend policy. 
But the critical assumptions of this theory are (1) 
no taxes, (2) no floatation costs, and (3) no brokerage 
fees. In actuality, market imperfections such as taxes, 
transaction costs, and inconvenience costs impede such 
"homemade" dividend actions. 
Though the MM irrelevancy propositon requires only 
that dividend payout not affect investment decisions, the 
11 
opposite possibility is not ruled out by MM. That is, 
investment decisions can affect dividends. For example, 
the firm may simply choose to treat dividends as a 
residual payout after all profitable investment projects 
have been undertaken. This is not inconsistent with MM 
proposition that the value is not affected by the 
dividend policy. 
Although many firms follow a "passive residual" 
dividend policy, these firms may strive to maintain a 
stable dividend record. Most practioners believe that 
dividends are important because they help to resolve 
uncertainty for investors. Futhermore, in the "real" 
world, transaction costs associated with raising new 
external funds are significant. A policy of retaining a 
greater proportion of earnings when the firm has a large 
number of attractive investment opportunities is likely 
to be a wealth maximizing strategy. 
The broad objectives of dividend policy are to 
maximize owners' wealth. This policy should maximize the 
wealth over the long run while providing sufficient 
financing for the firm to invest in acceptable projects. 
These objectives are not mutually exclusive, but rather, 
they are closely related since both the payment of 
dividends and the investment in attractive projects 
contribute to the long-run maximization of the owners' 
12 
wealth. The important point is that the firm views 
dividends not as a residual but as an active decision 
variable. 
In the case of intracompany dividends, this argument 
makes even more sense because the source of dividends and 
the recipients are part of the same organization. Also, 
multinational corporations view the dividend payment as a 
means of transferring earnings. They may place strategic 
importances on the intracompany dividend policy. 
(2) SIGNALING HYPOTHESIS 
If the Miller and Modigliani (MM) proposition that 
dividend policy is irrelevant to the value of the firm is 
true, how can the "irrelevant" ("passive residual") view 
of dividend policy be reconciled with the tendency of 
most firms to maintain a consistent or steadily growing 
dividend payment records? No one has yet successfully 
explained the cross-sectional differences in dividend 
payouts across the firms. 
MM recognize that dividends may provide "information 
content" to investors, indicating to investors what 
management believes future earnings prospects are likely 
to be. The information content of dividends is a theory 
13 
"signals" of future earnings changes. When dividends are 
raised, this is interpreted by investors that management 
expects higher levels of future earnings. Therefore, if 
a firm's stock price increases with a dividend increase, 
the reason may not be investors ' preference for dividends 
but expectations of higher future earnings. 
In empirical studies of the signalling hypothesis of 
dividends, the question generally asked is; "does the 
announcement of a dividend really affect share prices?" 
A pathfindings study in this area was made by Fama, 
Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969). They investigated the 
impact of stock splits on shareholder's wealth in 
relation to market efficiency. They speculated that the 
stock splits might be interpreted by investors as a 
message about future changes in the firm's expected cash 
flows. They hypothesized that stock splits might be 
interpreted as a message about future dividend increases, 
which in turn imply that the firm's managers feel 
confident that they can maintain a permanently higher 
level of cash flows. Fama, et al, found that when stock 
splits were accompanied by dividend announcement there 
was an increase in the adjusted share prices for the 
group which announced the dividend increases and a 
decline in share prices for the dividend decrease group. 
Pettit(1972, 1976) supported the proposition that 
14 
the market uses the dividend announcement as the 
information for assessing the share price. Using CAR 
(Cumulative Average Residuals), he found that substantial 
information is conveyed by the announcement of the 
dividend changes. The problem of Pettit's study was that 
he used expected dividend changes rather than unexpected 
dividend changes. 
Watts' study (1973) found a positive dividend 
announcement effect on the value of the firm but 
concluded that it was not economically significant. He 
used Fama and Babiak's (1968) dividend payment model, and 
market models. Watts' measurement was the API (Abnormal 
Performance Index) which measured departures from the 
risk-adjusted rate of return of the market model. The 
API for a security is computed as the product of its 
one-month abnormal returns. 14 The performance of 
firms with the dividend increases is better than that of 
firms with the dividend decreases, but the greatest 
difference between the two samples in the six months 
preceding dividend changes and dividend announcement is 
trivial in the month of dividends. 
Ross (1977) found two problems in MM's dividend 
irrelevancy proposition. They are : (1) the market 
"knows" the random return stream of the firm, and (2) the 
market values this stream to set the value of the firm 
15 
(here, actual risk is dealt with more than perceived 
risk). Ross argued that perceived risk is more important 
than actual risk in valuing the firm. He also claimed 
that as changes in the financial structure may influence 
perceived risk, changes in the dividend payout likewise 
may influence perceived risk. Hence, an increase in 
dividends is a signal that the firm expects sufficient 
future cash flows. 
Bhattacharya (1979) argued for the signalling 
approach in the sense that an unexpected dividend 
increase will be a favorable sign in spite of the tax 
disadvantage. Thus, dividends convey information on the 
value of the firm which can not be communicated by other 
means such as annual reports and earnings forecasts. 
Kwan (1981) improved Pettit's study by forming 
portfolios based on the unexpected dividend changes and 
his result supported the information content of the 
dividend relevancy hypothesis. He found statistically 
significant abnormal returns when the firms announced 
unexpectedly large dividend changes. 
Rozeff (1981) suggests that an optimal dividend 
policy may exist even though we ignore tax 
considerations. Paying dividends has a tradeoff : the 
benefit of reducing agency costs ^ and the cost of 
raising external floatation cost. He argues that 
16 
wealth-maximizing firms adopt an optimal 
bonding/monitoring policy which minimizes agency cost; 
and that the dividend payment serves as a means of 
bonding/monitoring performance. 
In the case of the intracompany dividend payment, 
the "signalling" arguments do not seem relevant, either 
because the information is not available to the market or 
because the firm is making the dividend decision based on 
budgetary or strategic considerations. 
(3) CLIENTELE EFFECTS 
The "clientele effect" is the tendency of a 
publicly-held firm to attract those investors whose 
dividend preferences correspond to the dividend policy 
of the firm. If management modifies a firm's dividend 
policy, it takes the risks associated with a change in 
the common stock price while a change in its stockholder 
clientele takes place. The stockholders who preferred 
the previous dividend policy may sell the stock, driving 
down its price for a period of time until the buyers 
preferring the new policy are attracted to the stock. 
Thus, those companies with high dividends will have a 
clientele of investors with lower marginal tax rates and 
strong desires for current income. Similiarly, those 
17 
companies with low dividends will attract a clientele of 
investors with little need for the current income, and 
who often have high marginal tax rates. The clientele 
effect was first used by MM (1961) to argue for the 
irrelevancy of the dividend payout to the value of the 
firm. 
Elton and Gruber (1970) attempted to present and 
test a method of determining marginal stockholder tax 
brackets and to explore the implications of their 
findings for corporate investment policy, corporate 
dividend policy, and the assumption of market 
rationality. With relation to dividend policy, they 
emphasized the importance of marginal stockholder tax 
brackets as follows: 16 
Knowledge of marginal stockholder brackets will 
also allow us to draw inferences about the importance 
of dividend policy. Such inference could be made if 
we find a strong relationship between corporate 
dividend policy and investment tax rates. The 
establishment of this relationship would provide 
evidence that supports the clientele effect of Miller 
and Modigliani (each firm is assumed to have a body of 
stockholders who find dividend policy optimum). 
Further, such a finding means that a change in 
dividend policy might cause a change in clientele and 
this could be costly. 
Noting that the implied tax bracket decreases when 
dividend payout increases, Elton and Gruber conclude that 
the evidence supports Modigliani's and Miller's clientele 
effect, suggesting that a change in dividend policy could 
18 
cause a costly change in shareholder wealth. Drawbacks 
in their study are: 
1) Arbitrage may be carried out by the traders who do not 
own the stock initially. 
2) No transaction costs were assumed, 
3) Tax-free investors should be considered. 
Pettit (1977) has tested for the clientele effects 
by examining the portfolio positions of the individual 
accounts handled by a brokerage house. He found the 
clientele effect by arguing that the stocks with low 
dividend yields would be preferred by the investors with 
high income. 
Lewellen, Stanley, Lease and Schlarbaum (1978) 
reached a different conclusion from Pettit. They found 
very weak clientele effects and concluded: 17 
Thus, even though high-income investors might, all 
other things equal, tend to prefer low-dividend-yield 
equities, these other things are not entirely equal. 
Risk appetites, transaction costs, diversification 
needs-and perhaps perceived opportunities to exploit 
transitory discrepancies-can easily lead investors to 
select (and retain) stocks from the full spectrum of 
dividend-paying categories in arranging their ongoing 
portfolios. As a result, there may well be no 
substantial tax-rate specialization within securities 
yield class after all, and that is what is required 
for a firm to think seriously about targeting its 
dividend and/or investment policies at a specific 
shareholder subset. We certainly find no indication 
of such intense specialization. The investor/owner 
marginal tax rate array displays ample representation 
in all rate brackets, and is in fact quite similar 
across companies, regardless of their dividend-yield 
attributes. Presumably, therefore, other aspects of 
the individual security-selection process are as 
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important as the pure tax effect. 
Basically the clientele effect was developed to 
explain the difference in preferring high or low dividend 
payment stocks based on the different marginal tax rates 
of investors. The clientele effect may be relevant for 
intracompany dividend policy in relation to host country 
corporate tax rates and home country tax rates on 
repatriated income. When the sum of the foreign 
corporate income tax rates and withholding tax rates on 
repatriated dividends is greater than the U.S. income tax 
rate, the dividend payment is maximized in order to take 
advantage of the double tax relief. Contrary to the case 
above, the dividend payment is minimized because the 
parent firm can claim the double tax relief only to the 
amount of taxes paid on earnings. 18 
(4) STOCK REPURCHASE 
In a stock repurchase, a company purchases its own 
stock either in the open market or through a tender 
offer. Repurchasing the shares is a way of passing cash 
directly to the shareholders who sell their shares back 
to the firm. Two competing hypotheses capable of 
exploiting stock repurchase at premium have received 
attention in the literature. 
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First, the managerial entrenchment hypothesis 
predicts that non-participating stockholders suffer 
wealth losses when incumbent management acts to deter a 
credible threat of control transfer posed by a 
substantial stockholder. The competing interests 
prediction is that non-participating stockholders gain 
because the reduced threat of competition for control 
leads to real resource savings associated with the 
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process of competition. 
If earnings remain constant, the result of a 
repurchase is to raise the per share earnings on those 
shares remaining outstanding since there will be less 
shares having a claim on the same amount of earnings. 
Since less shares will own the same firm, the value of 
each share should rise accordingly. In other words, the 
repurchase or retirement of common stock can be viewed as 
a type of reverse dilution since the earnings per share 
and market value of stock are increased by reducing the 
number of shares outstanding. 
Tender offers for stock repurchase are related to 
the information signal hypothesis from the results 
reported by Dann (1981) and Vermaelen (1981). After 
testing for various hypotheses, Dann and Vermaelen 
reported significant abnormal returns of approximately 15 
percent (on the average) after repurchase tender offer 
announcements and conclude that disclosure of new 
information is the principle explanation of this value 
increase. 
There may be tax incentive for stock repurchase 
which is not found in cash dividends. The tender for 
stock repurchase will be taxed as a capital gain rather 
than a dividend if the repurchase is substantially 
disproportionate to the extent that the individual 
shareholder must have sold more than 20% of his holding 
in the tender offer.^0 
(5) Historical payout model 
In the 1950s, John Lintner interviewed with 28 
selected companies from a list of 600 matured 
corporations in order to investigate their thinking on 
the determination of dividend policy. The results of 
these interviews lead Lintner to develop and test a 
dividend model based on the partial adjustment model. 
Suppose that a firm always stuck to its target payout 
ratio. Then the dividend per share in the coming year 
(Dl) would be a constant proportion of earnings per 
share (E-^) . 
* 
D i = target dividend per share 
* 
D i = target ratio x 
The dividend change would equal 
- Dq = target change 
= r Ei - v 
where 
D0 = previous year's dividend per share 
= current year's dividend per share 
= current year's earnings per share, 
r = target ratio 
A firm that attempts to maintain its payout ratio 
would have to change its dividend whenever the earnings 
changed. But the managers would be reluctant to do thi 
if they believe that shareholders prefer a stable 
progression of dividends. Therefore even if the 
circumstances appeared to warrant a large increase in 
their company's dividends, they would move only partway 
toward their target payment. Their dividend change 
therefore seemed to conform to the following mode. 
D1 ” D0 = adjustment rate x target change 
= c ( r E1 - D0) 
where 
c = adjustment rate. 
The more conservative the company, the more slowly it 
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would move toward its target dividends and, therefore, 
the lower would be its adjustment rate, while the more 
aggressive the company the more quickly it would move 
toward the target dividends hence the higher would be its 
adjustment rate. 
If we use another notation, we have the following 
dividend payout model. 
(1) D*t = rEt 
(2) Dt - D,..! = a + c(D*t - D^) + Ut 
Substituting (1) into (2) yields 
(3) Dt - Dt_1 = a + crEt - cDt_1 + Ut 
Alternatively, 
(4) Dt = a + cr Et + (l-c)Dt_1 + Ut 
where U^. j_s error term. 
The model implies that dividends depend in part on 
the firm's current earnings and in part on the dividends 
for the previous year, which in turn depends on that 
year's earnings and the dividends in the year before. 
24 
The constant term "a" was added to Lintner's model to 
test whether managers have greater reluctance to cut 
dividends than to raise them. The probability of an 
increase in dividends should be greatest when current 
earnings have increased ; it should be somewhat less when 
only the earnings from the previous year have increased 
and so on. 
Upon fitting the equation to annual data from 1918 
through 1941, Lintner found that the model explained 85% 
of the changes in dividends for his sample of 
companies. x The average speed of adjustment in the 
equation was approximately 30% per year and the target 
payout was 50% of earnings. 
Empirical evidence by Fama and Babiak (1968) shows 
that a lagged dependent variable used as an explanatory 
variable is appropriate because the effect of a given 
change in earnings on the dividend stream declines over 
time. They investigated many different models for 
explaining dividend behavior using a sample of 201 firms 
with 18 years of data (1947-1964). They examined the 
results obtained when various dividend models are used to 
predict the changes in dividend per share paid by 
individual firms during 1965. The evidence suggests that 
for a majority of firms models with the constant 
suppressed provide better predictions of dividend changes 
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than models in which the value of the constant is left 
completelely free. They ranked various models by size of 
average absolute error. The average absolute error 
criterion provided a much more even weighting of 
individual prediction errors than either mean square 
error or interfractile ranges. They concluded as 
follows: 22 
The two variable Lintner model including a constant 
term, D., and E. performed well relative to 
other models; in general, however, deleting the 
constant, and adding the lagged profits variable 
E.leads to a slight improvement in the predictive 
power of the model. 
II-2 Dividend Remittance Behavior of MNCs 
David B. Zenoff (1966) attempted to account for the 
repatriation of income from the foreign U.S. affiliates 
operating in Europe by extending Lintner s stable payout 
hypothesis (1956). The stable payout hypothesis applied 
to the MNC states that the repatriation of earnings from 
the affiliates is a function of current earnings and past 
remittances. Specifically, Zenoff cited three possible 
determinants of the affiliate dividend policy; tax rate 
both of home country and of host country, political risk, 
and foreign exchange risk. 
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George F. Kopits (1971) pointed out two significant 
problems in the dividend remittance behavior of MNC. 
First, the foreign subsidiary dividends are equity 
transfers within the same international firm rather than 
disbursements to the individual stockholders who 
presumably expect a steady flow of dividends. Secondly, 
the foreign subsidiaries tend to finance capital 
expansion through retained earnings. He tried to explain 
the repatriation of foreign subsidiary earnings within 
the context of a well-defined optimizing behavior of the 
international firm. But owing to data limitations, he 
investigated the tax impact on only one -although major- 
component of intracorporate financial flows, namely, the 
repatriation of subsidiary earnings. He postulated that 
the subsidiary dividends are determined residually by the 
demand for and supply of investable internal funds, 
represented respectively, by the changes in the value of 
the equilibrium capital stock and by the after-tax 
earnings. Thus, a rise in the home tax rate would 
depress the dividend remittances through the cost of 
capital, while a rise in the host tax rate would have a 
dual effect on dividends : an increase, through the cost 
of capital, and a fall, through the level of earnings. 
Kopits estimated the dividend equation using weighted 
least-squares regressions on the cross sectional data for 
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1962 for U.S. controlled foreign subsidiaries, aggregated 
by host country. The tax effect, transmitted through the 
rental cost of capital, was confirmed for the 
manufacturing subsidiaries established in the developed 
host countries. In addition to the average realized home 
and host tax rates, there was also a strong response to 
the split system of taxation present in certain host 
countries (Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, and 
Japan). By the split system we mean the tax system with 
high corporate tax rate (50-52%) on retained earnings and 
low tax rate (15-23%) on dividends. By implication, the 
size of elasticities of the dividend remittance suggests 
that the taxation is a powerful tool in influencing the 
direct investment flows to the industrial countries. A 
major problem in Kopits' study can be pointed out. The 
flow of direct investment(GKO) can be broken down into 
its component parts, i.e., the net capital outflow from 
the parent company (NKO) and the parent company share of 
retained earnings of the foreign affiliates (RE) which is 
the difference between the affiliate's earnings (NI) and 
the repatriated dividends (DIV). Kopits does not include 
net capital outflow from the parent company (NKO). 
Robbins and Stobaugh (1973), in their survey of the 
multinational firm financial practice, found some other 
factors which influence the foreign affiliate dividend 
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practice. The factors are age and size of affiliates, 
availability of funds, and joint venture partners. Older 
affiliates provide a great share of their earnings to the 
parent, presumably because as the affiliate matures, it 
has lessened reinvestment opportunities while at the same 
time the marginal returns in newer locations of the world 
are greater. With regard to size, Robbins and Stobaugh 
found that small firms are less likely to have 
established any underlying principles for determining the 
dividend policy. The availability of internally 
generated funds also affects the dividend policy of the 
foreign subsidiaries. Some affiliates must borrow to 
continue an established dividend policy. Existence of 
joint-venture partners or of local minority interest is 
also an important factor influencing the dividend policy. 
Robbins and Stobaugh found the evidence that the local 
stock ownership leads toward more stable dividend 
payments regardless of earnings. 
In an attempt to explain the retained earnings of 
the foreign subsidiaries, Walter Ness (1975) formulated a 
model in which the retention rate is a function of the 
ratio of direct investment to gross national product, the 
changes in the foreign exchange rates, and the 
opportunity cost of internal funds. Upon applying 
ordinary least squares to 1969-71 cross sectional 
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observations on the U.S. manufacturing direct investments 
in 19 major host countries, Ness found that the taxation 
does affect the retention rate ; an increment in the home 
tax rate leads to a rise in retained earnings, whereas a 
hike in the host tax rate reduces the retention. 
Further, the evidence indicated that the U.S. foreign 
subsidiaries make use of excess foreign tax credits by 
electing the overall limitation rather than the 
pre-country limitation. 
A shortcoming common to the study of the foreign 
affiliate's financial behavior is the analysis of 
dividends or retained earnings of the foreign 
subsidiaries in isolation. Ladenson (1972) employed a 
balance sheet approach, making an improvement in this 
respect. A model of the determinants of the rate of 
foreign direct investments and interactions of a number 
of asset and liability changes is examined. Five uses of 
funds (fixed investment expenditures, change in 
inventories, change in receivables, change in others 
assets, and dividends) are identified with two sources of 
funds (funds from the home country, and funds raised 
abroad). The sources and uses of funds (balance-sheet 
changes) identity with five assets and two liabilities is 
postulated with a vector of equilibrium values towards 
which the model adjusts along the conventional 
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stock-adjustment lines. In a set of seven reduced form 
equations, each flow of funds is specified as a function 
of three exogenous variables which are the level of 
affiliate sales, the difference between home and host tax 
rates, and the difference between home and host country 
central bank discount rates. • Each question was estimated 
by ordinary least squares on annual data for 1957-65 on 
the U.S. direct investment pooled across major geographic 
regions (Canada, Latin America, Europe, and the rest of 
the world). Contrary to a priori expectations, the 
structural coefficient of the tax rate differential in 
the dividend equation is positive. Estimation of the 
reduced form parameters precludes the calculation of the 
significance of the tax variable coefficients. Ladenson 
approach basically attempts to treat direct investment 
flows from the perspective of an unconstrained portfolio 
investor allocating the balance sheet items as a function 
of tax and interest-rate differentials and sales. But 
his model is left open to the criticism with regard to 
the specification of the exogenous variables and more 
seriously, to the measurement of the underlying data. In 
any event, the failure of the model to corroborate the 
effect of taxation (at least on subsidiary dividends) is 
no surprise, given the regional aggregation of statutary 
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host tax rates. 
Horst (1977) analyzed the impact of tax rate on the 
investment and financial decisions of the MNC. In his 
model, the firm has three control variables at its 
disposal; investment in parent assets, investment in 
subsidiary assets, and net capital outflow from the 
parent to the foreign subsidiary. The optimal level of 
each variable is derived from the objective function 
(maximization of the MNC's consolidated global after-tax 
earnings). Horst made changes in the standard 
formulation by specifying the mix of intracorporate 
equity and debt within the net capital outflow, thereby 
distinguishing between the taxation of subsidiary income 
and of deductible interest remittances. Also, he 
explicitly introduced the availiability of excess foreign 
tax credits to the firm under the credit limitation. But 
in this study, the retained earnings and dividends of the 
subsidiary are assumed to be a constant relationship to 
after-tax earnings without regard to the level of desired 
capital formation. Also the level of external borrowing 
is determined in the model by the firm's excess demand 
for finance, that is, the gap between its internal use 
(desired investment outlays) and sources of funds 
(retained earnings and net capital outflow), and by 
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upward-sloping curves for the supply of outside funds. 
Mutti (1981) examined empirically the influence of 
the U.S. and foreign tax laws on the repatriation 
practices of the U.S. - based multinational corporations. 
Attention is paid to the total funds repatriated and the 
way these funds might be divided among dividends, 
interest payments, and royalities and overhead charges. 
With respect to the repatriation of dividends, when the 
parent firm is in a deficit credit position and the 
foreign corporate income tax rate exceeds the U.S. income 
tax rate, dividends received should be maximized. In the 
contrary case, where the U.S. corporate income tax rate 
is higher, the dividend inflow should be minimized. In 
this case, the repatriation of dividends to the United 
States imposes an immediate additional tax liability on 
the firm. This view is different from Adler's view. 
According to Adler (1979), the repatriation of dividends 
should be minimized regardless of whether dividends are 
brought back from a high-tax country or a low-tax 
country, because the foreign withholding taxes imposed on 
those dividend flows increase the firm's total world wide 
tax payments. If dividends are not repatriated, the 
firm's consolidated cash flow will be greater since the 
withholding taxes are avoided. 
Recently Gilman (1981), concerned with foreign 
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exchange risk and the liability structures of the 
subsidiaries' balance sheets, found that the foreign 
currency financing is more closely related to the changes 
in the subsidiaries' total assets, implying that all 
assets abroad are viewed as subject to the risk of 
exchange rate changes. The focus of his study was on the 
determinants of the net capital flow in home currency and 
the borrowing in foreign currency. But he raised the 
question whether the distributed profits (repatriated 
earnings) could be endogenized separately to yield a 
decision rule for the dividend payments to the head 
office. 
CHAPTER III 
rv_ 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
if' 
III-l Importance of Topic 
The objective of this study is to investigate models 
of behavior which explain the dividend policy of the U.S. 
owned foreign subsidiaries historically and 
cross-sectionally, and to examine the differences in the 
dividend payment behavior of U.S. owned foreign 
subsidiaries in different host countries. 
As indicated earlier, the channels (techniques) 
available to the MNCs for moving funds or profits 
internationally include the followings: 
A) Transfer prices, B) Reinvoicing centers, C) Fees and 
royalties, D) Leading and lagging, E) Intracorporate 
loans, F) Shifting compensating balance, G) Dividends, H) 
Debt versus equity investment, and I) Choice of invoicing 
currency. 
Among the channels, dividends are probably the most 
important and common means of transferring the profits 
from subsidiaries to the parent companies. 
The dividend payment behavior of the U.S. 
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corporations was first explained by Lintner (1956) who 
found that dividends depend in part on the firm's current 
earnings and in part on the past dividends. The research 
question is : Can Lintner's model explain the behavior of 
earnings from U.S. owned foreign subsidiaries to their 
U.S. parent? In the international setting many factors 
such as the exchange rates, host and home country 
corporation income tax, withholding tax, inflation rates, 
interest rates, currency control, parent company's target 
dividend payout ratio and the degree of ownership may 
also influence the repatriation of earnings from the 
foreign subsidiaries to the parent company, thereby 
changing the explanatory power of Lintner's model. 
In practice, most of the U.S. owned foreign 
subsidiaries were believed by many business practitioners 
to be willing to accelerate their dividend payments when 
they anticipate a devaluation of host country currency in 
order to protect their dividends. It was also found ^3 
that local equity participation tended to result in a 
more stable dividend record because these shareholders 
expected to receive a designated return on their equity 
investment regardless of the earnings. 
A previous study 24 showed that a substantial part 
of total financing of the U.S. owned foreign subsidiary 
came from the retained earnings, depreciation and 
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depletion allowances. As a result, changes in 
depreciation may influence intertemporal changes in 
dividends. If we consider some of the several factors 
referred to above in Lintner's model, we may better 
explain the dividend payment behavior of the U.S. owned 
foreign subsidiaries. 
One of the basic techniques in relation to dividend 
remittance is either to speed up dividend remittance to 
the parent companies from the foreign subsidiaries in the 
case of U.S. dollar revaluation or to delay (reduce) 
dividend remittance to the parent companies in the case 
of U.S. dollar devaluation. The addition of an exchange 
rate variable may improve the explanatory power of 
Lintner's model. 
If the interest rates were to go up in a host 
country, the increase would make retained earnings a 
relatively more attractive way of financing a new 
investment. Consequently, the dividend payment might be 
expected to decline. On the other hand, the lower 
interest rates in the host country would reflect the 
increased availability of funds in the market and enhance 
the ability of a given income stream to support debt. 
This argument might suggest equal or higher dividend 
payment. Also the U.S. interest rates may affect the 
dividend payment behavior of the U.S. owned foreign 
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subsidiaries. To investigate this payment behavior of 
foreign subsidiaries in relation to the interest rates of 
the host countries and the U.S. interest rates, in a 
similar fashion to incorporating the exchange rates, 
various forms of the interest rates can enter into a 
modified lagged adjustment model. 
III-2 Variables 
The dependent variable in both the cross-sectional 
and time series study is the level and change of 
dividends per share. Dividends of foreign subsidiaries 
paid out of net income are not directly distributed to 
the stockholders of the parent company. Dividends from 
foreign subsidiaries are repatriated to the parent 
company where the repatriated income is treated as income 
in the consolidated income statement of the parent 
company. In the case of joint venture, of course, a part 
of dividends of foreign subsidiaries is directly 
distributed to the local shareholders. This may have an 
effect on the dividend decision of the subsidiary. Total 
dividends of a foreign subsidiary are defined as the sum 
of dividend amounts given to the local equity 
shareholders and to the U.S. parent, and is the basis of 
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calculating the payout ratio (Total Dividends / Net 
Income) of foreign subsidiary. Dividends of foreign 
subsidiaries are subject to withholding taxes by the host 
government. The gross dividends are the dividends given 
to the parent company including these foreign withholding 
tax amounts while the net dividends do not include 
foreign withholding tax amounts. The income statements 
of the U.S. owned foreign subsidiaries show the total 
dividends only in host country currencies. 
The independent variables in both the 
cross-sectional and time-series studies are the factors 
which influence the dividend payment of the U.S. owned 
foreign subsidiaries. The factors are as follows. 
1. Net Income 
2. Depreciation 
3. Tax Rates (corporate income tax & withholding tax 
rate) 
4. Exchange Rates (annual average spot rate or end of 
period rate) 
5. Inflation Rates 
6. Interest Rates 
7. Parent Company's Payout Ratio 
8. Degree of Equity Ownership 
The details of each factor are explained below. 
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(1) Net Income 
Net Income is earnings or profits after host country 
corporate income taxes. These earnings or profits net of 
the foreign corporate income taxes are the basis of 
calculating the foreign subsidiaries' payout ratio. 
TABLE 2 illustrates the net income, total dividends, 
gross dividends before deduction of the foreign 
withholding taxes, and net dividends to be received by 
the U.S. parent company. It should be noted that 
dividends to be included in the U.S. consolidated income 
statement are the net dividends received plus withholding 
taxes plus deemed paid taxes. In TABLE 2, the foreign 
dividends to be included in the consolidated income 
statement of U.S. parent company are $36.44 ($18.72 + 
$17.72). 25 
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TABLE 2 
Net Income and Dividends of 
U.S. owned Canadian subsidiaries 
U.S. equity ownership = 90% 
Dividend Payout Ratio =40% 
Canada Corporate Income Tax Rate = 48% 
Withholding Tax Rate on Repatriated Dividends = 15% 
Units : U.S. $ 
Profits before Canadian Tax $100.00 
Canadian Corporate Tax at 48% 48.00 
Net Income 52.00 
Total Dividends (40% x 52) 20.80 
Gross Dividends (90% x 20.8) 18.72 
Withholding Tax (15% x 18.72) 2.81 
Net Dividends received in U.S. 15.91 
(2) Depreciation 
Depreciation is a source of internally generated 
funds for a company. Normally the cost of funds from 
depreciation is considered to be smaller than the cost of 
new equity. New issues of common stock give rise to 
underwritings which result in a higher cost of equity. A 
substantial part of total financing of the U.S. owned 
foreign subsidiaries is believed to come from retained 
earnings, depreciation, depletion and amortization 
allowances. So the changes in depreciation may also 
influence the intertemporal change of dividends. 
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Brittain (1966) tried to use the cash flow (net income 
plus depreciation) or to use the net income and 
depreciation separately as the measure of the firm's 
ability to pay dividends. 
(3) Tax Rates 
The study of the influence of taxes on the dividend 
payment of the U.S. owned foreign subsidiary requires an 
analysis of the tax treatment of the income and 
repatriated dividends. The host country has priority in 
taxing the earnings of foreign affiliates by imposing 
corporate income taxes and withholding taxes on the 
repatriation of profits. Many countries have a double 
taxation agreement with the United States. This means 
that the company can offset the payment of any local 
taxes against the United States tax liability on foreign 
earnings. 
Calculating the tax benefits involved in adjusting 
the dividend remittances from abroad is not an easy task. 
For example, a U.S. owned foreign subsidiary in Canada 
pays a Canadian income tax of 48 percent on its profits 
plus a withholding tax of 15 percent on any dividends 
paid to the United States, (see TABLE 3) 
TABLE 3 
Tax Effects of Dividend Remittance (year 1973) 
Assuming 100% U.S. Equity Control 
Assuming 100% Dividend Payout Ratio 
Canadian corporate income tax =48% 
Withholding tax on dividends = 15% 
(Unit : U.S.$) 
Profits before tax 
Canada corporate tax 
Net income 
Withholding tax (52x15%) 
Received in U.S. 
U.S. Corporate tax 
Less double tax relief 
(maximum 46.00) 
U.S. tax payable 
46.00 
46.00 
Available for dividends 
(Net Dividends) 
$100.00 
48.00 
52.00 
7.80 
44.20 
0.00 
44.20 
TABLE 4 
Tax Effects of Dividend Remittance (year 1973) 
Assuming 100% U.S. Equity Ownership 
Assuming 100% Dividend Payout Ratio 
Dutch corporate income tax = 36% 
Withholding tax on dividends = 5% 
(Unit : U.S.$) 
Profits before tax $100.00 
Dutch corporate tax 36.00 
Net income 64.00 
Withholding tax (64x5%) 3.20 
Received in U.S. 
U.S. Corporate tax 46.00 
Less double tax relief 39.20 
(maximum 46.00) 
U.S. tax payable 
60.80 
6.80 
54.00 Available for dividends 
(Net Dividends) 
The example in TABLE 3 shows that the subsidiary in 
Canada is exempt from any additional United States tax on 
these dividends. The next example in TABLE 4 shows what 
would happen if the Dutch income tax rate is 36 percent 
and withholding tax rate is 5 percent. In this case the 
subsidiary in the Netherlands could claim double tax 
relief only to the amount of taxes paid in the 
Netherlands. 
If we generalize this calculation assuming an 
effective host country corporate income tax rate of Tf, 
then each before-tax dollar of overseas income will 
provide (1-Tf) dollar of net income. If this net income 
is then repatriated in the form of dividends, with a 
dividend withholding tax rate of Td, the amount of money 
received by the parent, per dollar of the original 
income, will equal 
(1-Tf)(1-Td) = 1 - (Tf + Td - Tf x Td) = 1-TAX 
where 
TAX = Tf + Td - Tf x Td. 
After paying the U.S. taxes on the income, the parent 
winds up with : 
1) $.54, if TAX = Tf + Td - Tf x Td <.46 and no excess 
foreign tax credits are available. 
(This is the case of the U.S. Dutch subsidiary in 
the example above. Here, TAX is 39.20% (= 36% + 5% -36% 
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x 5%) which is less than 46%, U.S. tax rate. Hence net 
dividends are $54.00) 
2) 1-TAX, if TAX ^ .46 and no excess foreign tax credits 
are available. 
(This is the case of the U.S. Canadian subsidiary in 
the example above. Here TAX is 55.80% (= 48% + 15% - 48% 
x 15%) which is more than 46%, U.S. tax rate. Hence net 
dividends are $44.20 = 100 - 55.80.) 
This computation becomes more complex if only some 
excess tax credits are available or if only a portion of 
the new tax credits generated can be used. If the 
subsidiary is operating in a high-tax country with double 
tax agreements, the dividend payments are not subject to 
additional United States taxes. 
Taxes in the parent country also influence the 
dividend remittance decision, especially when they are 
higher than the taxes in the foreign country. By varying 
the payout ratio among its foreign subsidiaries, the 
corporation can reduce its tax burden. 
In the developed host countries the tax rate on 
dividends is generally heavier than on industrial 
royalties or interest payments. The opposite is true in 
certain developing countries where royalties, interest 
payments, and other intracorporate service charges are 
being treated as the repatriation of income and are 
subject to the ordinary corporate tax. In either case, 
the overall host tax rate on dividends (i.e., the 
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withholding tax plus the underlying income tax) usually 
exceeds the host tax rate on the interests, royalties, or 
service charges.26 
It may be possible to defer the United States taxes 
by not remitting the profits from the low-tax-rate 
countries. But such profits are liable to be classified 
as "Subpart F" income, in which case they are taxable in 
the United States regardless of the remittance. 27 
(4) Foreign Exchange Rates 
Foreign exchange risk is defined as the variability 
of a firm's value that is due to the uncertain exchange 
rate changes. Foreign exchange exposure is defined as 
the degree to which a company is affected by the exchange 
rate changes. In making the dividend remittance 
decision, the firm must know what is at risk. Two kinds 
of foreign exchange exposures are involved in the 
dividend repatriation decisions from a subsidiary to 
parent company; accounting exposure and economic 
exposure. 
Accounting Exposure 
Accounting Exposure arises from the need, for 
purpose of reporting and consolidation, to convert the 
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results of the foreign operations from the foreign 
currencies to the home currency. When an exchange rate 
change occurs, the translation of the remitted dividends 
denominated in the foreign currency leads to a new value 
for the accounting measurement of the dollar value of the 
firm. The possible extent of this change in earnings is 
measured by the translation exposure figures. The 
translation exposure is just the difference between the 
exposed assets and exposed liabilities. 
Four principal translation methods are available : 
the current/non current method, the monetary/non monetary 
method, the temporal method, and the current method. 28 
FASB-8, which was based upon the temporal method, 
became effective on January 1, 1976. FASB-8 estabilished 
the uniform standards for the translation into dollars of 
the foreign currency denominated financial statements and 
transactions for the U.S.-based multinational companies. 
Its principal virtue was its consistency with the 
generally accepted accounting practice which requires 
that the balance sheet items be valued (translated) 
according to their underlying measurement basis. Before 
FASB-8, many companies estabilished a reserve and were 
able to defer the unrealized translation gains and losses 
by adding them to, or charging them against, the reserve. 
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In that way, they generally were able to cushion the 
impact of sharp changes in currency values on the 
reported earnings. 
The widespread dissatisfaction 29 over FASB-8 led, 
in 1981, to a proposed new translation method FASB-52. 
According to FASB-52, firms would use the current rate 
method to translate the foreign currency denominated 
assets and liabilities into dollars. The firms would be 
permitted to use the foreign currency reserve in an 
attempt to smooth out the earnings fluctuations caused by 
the currency movement. Adopted in 1984, FASB 52 is the 
current ruling governing the translation of the foreign 
subsidiary accounting records into the worldwide 
consolidated accounting statements. 
Economic Exposure 
Economic exposure is based on the possibility that 
the value of the firm, measured by the net present value 
of the firm's expected future after tax cash flows, will 
change when the exchange rates change. The currency 
fluctuations would affect both the firm's projected cash 
flows and the riskiness of those future cash flows. A 
change in the firm's risk profile could cause a change in 
the required discount rate or cost of equity capital. 
The contractual foreign currency cash flows arising from 
such committments as debt, long term lease, labor 
contracts, rents, utility charges and dividends will 
decrease in the home currency terms by the percentage of 
the foreign currency devaluation. The cash flow 
associated with the tax write-off of depreciable assets 
can have a substantial net present value, particularly 
for a capital-intensive corporation. 
Minimizing the economic exposure involves managing 
subset of a firm's true cash flow exposure. Hedging 
protects a firm from unforeseen currency fluctuations. 
One of the basic hedging techniques in relation to the 
dividend remittance is either to speed up the dividend 
remittance to the parent from the foreign subsidiary in 
case of the local currency devaluation (in other words 
the U.S. dollar revaluation) or to delay the dividend 
remittance to the parent company in case of the local 
currency appreciation (the U.S. dollar devaluation). In 
practice, most firms appear to accelerate their dividend 
payments when they anticipate the local currency 
devaluation (in other words the the U.S. dollar 
revaluation). 
(5) Inflation Rates 
At first, the distinction between the nominal 
exchange rates and the real exchange rates has important 
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implications for the exposure measurement and management. 
The nominal exchange rates are the rates we actually 
see in the market, and they are equal to the prices of 
one currency in terms of another. However, like the 
prices of goods in another year without being adjusted 
for the interim inflation, the nominal exchange rate 
changes may indicate nothing more than the reality that 
the countries have different inflation rates. In fact, 
according to the purchasing power parity, this should be 
the case. 
The real exchange rates are defined as the nominal 
exchange rates adjusted for changes in the relative 
purchasing power of each currency since some base period. 
If changes in the nominal rates are fully offset by 
changes in the relative price levels between the two 
countries, then the real exchange rates remain unchanged. 
If the real exchange rate changes, exchange risk will 
result. 
If the purchasing power parity holds, we would 
expect gains or losses from the nominal exchange rate 
changes to be offset over time by the effects of 
differences in the relative rates of inflation, thereby 
reducing the net impact of nominal devaluations and 
revaluations. The deviations from the purchasing power 
parity, however, will lead to the real exchange gains and 
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losses. In general, whenever the inflation rates differ 
by country but the nominal exchange rates remain fixed, 
then by definition the real exchange rates must change 
with the attendant consequences for the various economic 
sectors. 
(6) Interest Rates 
A dividend decision is the other side of a coin of 
financing decision because every one unit of money paid 
out in dividends is one unit less available to satisfy 
for the financing requirements of the firm's operations. 
For a company whose growth in assets is great, there 
typically is a need to finance externaly. In addition to 
debt, the equity base must be built either through the 
retention or the sale of common stock. With floatation 
cost, the retention usually is "cheaper" which argues for 
a low dividend payout ratio. 
A decline in the interest rates should result in 
lower cost of both debt and equity capital. This would 
tend to make more proposed capital investment projects 
acceptable, therefore requiring the larger amount of 
financing. This argument would support the lower 
dividend payout to provide the additional equity capital 
from the internal sources. On the other hand, the lower 
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interest rates would reflect the increased availibility 
of funds in the debt market and enchance the ability of a 
given income stream to support the debt. This line of 
reasoning might argue for the equal or higher payout 
ratio, relying upon the debt to finance the larger 
portion of the funds required by the additional capital 
investment. 
If the interest rates were to increase, the increase 
would make retained earnings a relatively attractive way 
of financing new investments. Consequently, the payout 
ratio might be expected to decline. 
All else being equal, a parent can set a different 
dividend payout ratio throughout the corporate system by 
setting a high dividend payout rate for the subsidiaries 
with relatively low opportunity costs of funds while 
requiring smaller dividend payments from those units 
facing the high borrowing costs or having the favorable 
investment opportunities. 
The interest rate theory of exchange rate 
expectations (International Fisher Effect), which says 
that the interest differentials will be the unbiased 
estimations of expected currency changes, is also 
relevant in assessing a firm's real exchange risk. 30 
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(7) Parent company target payout ratio 
Two surveys, one by Robbins and Stobaugh (1973) of 
thirty-nine U.S. multinationals and the other by David 
Zenoff (1968) of thirty U.S. multinationals, revealed the 
importance attached to the parent company's payout ratio 
in determining dividends to be received from abroad. 
Some firms require the same payout percentage as the 
parent's ratio for each of their subsidiaries, while 
others set a target payout as a percentage of the overall 
foreign-source earnings without attempting to receive the 
same percentage from each subsidiary. The rationale for 
focusing on the parent's payout ratio is that the 
subsidiaries should contribute their share of dividends 
paid to the stockholders. Thus, if the parent's payout 
ratio is 60%, then the foreign operations should 
contribute 60% of their earnings toward meeting this 
goal. Establishing a uniform percentage from each unit, 
rather than an overall target, is explained as an attempt 
to persuade foreign governments, particularly for those 
of less developed countries, that these payments are 
necessary rather than arbitrary. MNCs are often willing 
to accept higher tax costs to maintain the principle that 
dividends are necessary and legitimate business expenses. 
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(8) The degree of equity ownership 
The presence of local stockholders poses a major 
constraint on an MNC's ability to adjust its dividend 
policy in accordance with the global factors. All (or 
majority) owned foreign subsidiaries may have more 
discretion in deciding the dividend payment than the 
minority owned subsidiaries. The distinction between 
majority and minority ownership is highly subjective. 
Usually 50% ownership has been the criteria of 
distinguishing the majority and monority ownership. Most 
of the countries tend to allow 100% ownership or more 
than 50% equity ownership to the foreign subsidiaries. 
Robbins and Stobaugh (1973) found that the local 
equity participation tends to result in a more stable 
dividend record because these shareholders expected to 
receive a designated return on their equity investment 
regardless of the earnings. The parent company hesitated 
to increase its dividends for fear of the difficulty in 
reducing them later should the earnings decline. 
Conflicts with the local equity investors should arise 
because they demand a shorter period and more certain 
return while the MNC needs a higher earnings retention 
rate for a longer-term purpose. 
CHAPTER IV 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
IV-1 Hypotheses 
An MNC tries to maximize the returns for the entire 
operations whether it is a wholly owned subsidiary or a 
joint venture. Earlier under fixed exchange rate system, 
the U.S. owned foreign subsidiaries did not need to be 
concerned with the effect of exchange rates on dividends 
repatriated to the parent companies. But under the 
floating exchange rates, they have become more concerned 
with the real value of the repatriated dividends. The 
dividend payment decision has been given a strategic 
importance in relation to fluctuating exchange rates. 
Also the fluctuating exchange rate periods are 
characterized by the high interest rates and inflation 
rates. Given these uncertain financial variabes under 
floating exchange rates, the intracompany dividend 
payment may not be the same as before. Even though David 
Zenoff's study ( 1966) showed that Lintner's model 
explained well the dividend payment behavior of U.S. 
owned foreign affiliates under fixed exchange rates. 
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whether Lintner s model is still valid or not under 
floating exchange rates in the international setting is 
unknown at this stage. Lintner's model may be 
misspecified, hence must have have additional variables 
to increase the explanatory power. Or the explanatory 
power of Lintner's model must be specified under 
different regimes, i.e., fixed exchange rates versus 
floating exchange rates. The effect of the earlier 
mentioned variables such as exchange rates, interest 
rates, and inflation rates may be important, unimportant, 
or unknown. Thus the overall effect of the three 
variables needs to be studied and tested. Given this 
context, several hypotheses can be developed. 
HYPOTHESIS I 
The first hypothesis addresses the validity of 
Lintner's model under floating exchange rates. As said 
before, David Zenoff (1966) found that Lintner's partial 
adjustment model was good in explaining the dividend 
payment behavior of U.S. owned foreign subsidiaries, 
arguing that the repatriation of earnings from foreign 
affiliates is a function of current earnings and the past 
remittances. But the study was done under fixed exchange 
rates. Given fluctuating exchange rates, interest rates. 
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and inflation rates under floating exchange rates, we 
suspect that Lintner's model is still valid. So the null 
hypothesis is set as follows. 
NULL HYPOTHESIS (HQ) 
The U.S. owned foreign subsidiaries have the same 
payment behavior during the periods of fixed exchange 
rates and floating exchange rates. 
ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESIS (H ) 
The U.S. owned foreign subsidiaries do not have the 
same payment behavior during the periods of fixed 
exchange rates and floating exchange rates. 
HYPOTHESIS II 
The second hypothesis is intended to check whether 
the exchange rate variable can enter into Lintner s model 
in order to better explain the dividend payment behavior 
of the U.S. owned foreign subsidiaries. The hypothesis 
goes further to investigate a theoretical hedging 
technique of an forseen foreign exchange fluctuations in 
relation to dividend remittance. One of the basic 
hedging techniques in relation to the dividend remittance 
is to speed up the dividend remittance to the parent 
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company in case of U.S. dollar revaluation and to 
decrease it in case of U.S. dollar devaluation. So the 
hypothesis is stated as follows. 
H0: The U.S. owned foreign subsidiaries do not adjust 
their dividend payments to the exchange rates. 
Devaluation of the U.S. dollars against the host 
country currency would reduce or delay the dividend 
payment of the U.S. owned foreign subsidiaries while 
revaluation of the U.S. dollars would raise or 
accelerate the dividend payment of the U.S. owned 
foreign subsidiaries. 
HYPOTHESIS III 
If the interest rates were to go up in a host 
country, the increase would make retained earnings as 
relatively attractive way of financing new investments. 
On the other hand, the lower interest rates would reflect 
the increased availability of funds in debt market and 
enhance the ability of a given income stream to support 
the debt. This line of reasoning might argue for the 
equal or higher dividend payment. So the hypothesis can 
be set up as follows. 
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H0: The U.S. owned foreign subsidiaries do not adjust 
their dividend payments to the interest rates of host 
countries and the U.S. interest rates. 
H^: An increase in the interest rates of host countries 
would reduce or delay the dividend payment while a 
decrease in the interest rates would raise the 
dividend payment of the U.S. owned foreign 
subsidiaries. 
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IV-2 Methodology 
(1) Preliminary Tests 
The simple average payout ratios, standard 
deviations, and coefficients of variation in payout 
ratios between the U.S. parent companies and their 
foreign subsidiaries will show the basic differences or 
similarities in the dividend payment behavior. Large 
coefficients of variation for the payout ratio may imply 
that the subsidiaries do not have a definite target 
payout ratio. Next, the whole data set is divided into 
two groups, the periods of fixed exchange rates 
(1964-1972) versus the periods of floating exchange rates 
(1973-1982). The same calculations will be done for each 
of these groups. 
Next, the correlation between the payout ratios of 
U.S. owned foreign subsidiaries and their U.S. parent 
companies will be calculated. High correlation might 
suggest that the subsidiaries follow parent companies 
payout ratio while low correlation may suggest that the 
parent companies * payout ratio has nothing to do with 
their foreign subsidiaries' payout ratio. 
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Finally, simple correlation coefficients between net 
income per share (EPS) and dividends per share (DPS) of 
all subsidiaries during the whole period are calculated. 
The magnitude of correlation coefficient will show 
whether the level of dividends is associated with the 
level of earnings. 
(2) Partial Adjustment Model 
Following the preliminary tests, Lintner's model is 
evaluated. ^1 Lintner's model is an application of the 
partial adjustment model. He concluded that most 
dividend decisions of a firm can be explained in terms of 
the following two equations. 
(2) Dt - Dt-l = a + c(D t - Dt_i) + Ut 
The "desired" dividend payment D* is determined by 
the net income n current period and the target 
payout ratio r. It is also assumed that the level of 
dividend payment will move only partially from the 
starting position to the desired position D*t 
when net income E^. increases or decreases to a new 
level. The move depends on the confidence of management 
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in maintaining the new level of dividends. Thus the 
change of dividends between time t and time t-1 would be 
equal to c(Dt _ Dt-l) instead of (Dt -Dt-i). 
The parameter c is the speed of adjustment coefficient, 
and (1-c) is sometimes interpreted as the safety factor 
for not adjusting to the desired level based on current 
net income. The constant term a in equation (2) was 
added by Lintner to test whether managers have greater 
reluctance to cut dividends than to raise them. This 
constant term is postulated to be positive. Therefore, 
the firm will not cut its dividend payments unless c(Dt 
-Dt_i) is less than the constant term. Finally, Ut 
is an error term. Substituting (1) into (2) yields 
(3) - Dt-l = a + crEt - cDt-1 + Ut 
Alternatively, 
^ Dt = a + cr Et + (l-c)Dt-i + Ut 
where U^ is an error term. 
Most of the behavioral models such as (4) imply that 
the current dividends are a function of current earnings 
and past dividends. The basic lagged adjustment model in 
the statistical literature is as follows: 32 
D*t = a + rEt + Ut 
Dt ~ Dt-l = c(D*t - Dt-l) 
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The reduced form is 
Dt “ Dt-l = ac + crEt “ cDt-l + cUt 
Alternatively, 
Dt = ac + crEt + ^“c^Dt-l + cUt 
Here the constant term and error term are put in the 
desired dividend equation not in the adjustment equation. 
The only difference is that in equation (4) the 
constant term and the error term may have simpler 
properties than in this case. Lintner's partial 
adjustment model where the constant term and error term 
are put in the adjustment equation makes more sense 
because managers in the company are reluctant to cut 
dividends. And most of the study of this kind afterwards 
/for example, Fama and Babiak (1968) and Djarraya (1980), 
used Lintner's model as the basis of the empirical study. 
Hence, in the following tests Lintner's partial 
adjustment model will be used to check whether it is 
misspecified with relation to exchange rates and interest 
rates in the international setting, and whether its 
explanatory power must be specified under different 
regimes, fixed versus floating exchange rates. 
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(3) Extension of Lintner's Model 
The dividend payment of a foreign subsidiary is not 
distributed directly to the shareholders in the home 
country. It is equity transfer from the subsidiary to 
the parent company. When the parent company prepares its 
balance sheets and income statements, the company 
translates the dividend income ^ received from the 
foreign subsidiaries into the home currency-denominated 
income on the date of balance sheet and income statement. 
Basically, one might think that in the periods of 
floating exchange rates the desired dividend (D*) may 
not be a function of one explanatory variable (E). 
Rather it may be a function of earnings (E) and other 
explanatory variables such as exchange rates, interest 
rates, and inflation rates of host countries. In 
Lintner's partial adjustment model, all the possible 
independent variables may enter to explain the 
intertemporal change of dividends of a foreign 
subsidiary. Suppose the optimal level of dividends 
depend on both the earnings levels and other independent 
variables. Thus at a given earnings, one might expect 
dividends to move more or less in step with changes in 
exchange rates, interest rates, and/or changes in price 
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levels, but to react much more slowly to earnings 
changes. 
The dependent variable variable can be Dt-1 or 
D^. in the reduced form of equation (3), the variable 
Dt-1 appears also on the right hand side of the 
equation, so that the same variable appears as both an 
independent variable and as a component of the dependent 
variable. This approach makes the R2 valuse incorrect, 
though the estimates of coefficients and their standard 
errors are unaffected. The coefficient of the lagged 
variable will be of opposite sign to the parameter 
of the model. The customary approach is to consolidate 
the variable on ^he right hand side, so that the 
only variable on the left hand side is D. 
L. • 
The independent variables of exchange rates and 
interest rates can enter into Lintner's model either in 
the form of level or in the form of changes. In the 
economic literature, change means flow while level means 
stock. The changes of each variable seem to make more 
sense because the corporations are more sensitive to the 
changes in exchange rates and interest rates than the 
absolute level of exchange rates and interest rates. In 
the following extension of Lintner's model, when the 
dependent variable is level then the level of each 
independent variable will be used while the changes of 
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dependent variable will be matched to the changes of 
independent variable. Specifically, the independent 
variables, that is, exchange rates, interest rates, and 
inflation rates may be added to Lintner's model in two 
ways. One way is to add the levels of each variable to 
the desired dividend equation and the other is to add the 
changes of each variable except inflation rates to the 
adjustment equation. If we put the new variables in the 
desired dividend equation it may imply that the new 
variables affect the desired dividend itself, while if we 
put the new variables in the adjustment equation it may 
imply that they affect the adjustment rate at which a 
foreign subsidiary moves toward the target dividend D*. 
Adding the new variables to the target dividend 
equation, the relevant equations are : 
(5) D*t = rEt + B3EXt + B4It + B5*Pt 
(6) — ^t-l = a + c( D*(- - D-£—i) + U-^ 
The reduced form is 
(7) Dt_Dt_1=a+crEt-cDt_1+cB3EXt+cB4lt+cB5APt+Ut 
Alternatively, 
(8) Dt=a+crEt+(1-c)Dt_1+cB3EXt+cB4It+cB5APt+Ut 
where EX = Annual average in units of foreign 
currencies per U.S. dollar. 
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I = Period average of treasury bill rates or 
short term money market rates of the host 
countries, 
P = Annual average consumer price index of host 
countries, 
AP t 
x 100 
and Ut is an error term. 
Adding the new variables to the adjustment equation, 
the relevant equations are : 
(9) D*t = rEt 
(10) Dt-Dt_1=a+c(D*t-Dt_1)+B3AEXt+B4AIt+B5APt+Ut 
The reduced form is 
(11) Dt-Dt_^=a+crEt-cDt-l+B3AEXt+B4AIt+B5APt+Ut 
Alternatively, 
(12) Dt=a+crEt+(l-c)Dt_1+B3AEXt+B4AIt+B5APt+Ut 
where EX = Annual average in units of foreign 
AEXt _ 
currencies per U.S. dollar, 
EXt-EXt-l 
x loo 
EXt-l 
I = Period average of treasury bill rates or 
short term money market rates of the host 
countries, 
A1+. = It - It-1 
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P Annual average consumer price index of host 
countries, 
AP = --I--—i-x 100 
Pt-1 
and Ut is an error term. 
Note that the reduced equation (8) is of the same 
form as the reduced equation (12), but has a different 
coefficient on the different independent variable. Both 
of these models will be used to test the null hypothesis 
II and III. Because our concern is to investigate the 
effect of exchange rates, interest rates, and inflation 
rates on the intracompany dividends, we are not only 
interested in the coefficient cB^ CB4, and CB5 of 
the reduced equation (8), but in the coefficient B^, 
B4, and B5 of the reduced equation (12). 
When all the new independent variables are included 
in the reduced equations (8) and (12), F test associated 
with the analysis of variance is a test of the hypothesis 
that: 
cr = 1-c = B3 = B4 =b5 = 0 
or, cr = 1-c = cB3 = cb4 = cB5 =0, 
In other words, it is a test of whether there is a linear 
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relationship between the dependent variable and the 
entire set of independent variables. 
After analysis of F test is done with exchange 
rates, interest rates, and inflation rates all in the 
same equation, correlation among these three variables 
will be checked. 
(4) The Effect of Exchange Rates 
on the Intracompany Dividends 
Specifically in order to investigate the impact of 
exchange rates on the intracompany dividend payment, 
separate model using only the exchange rate variable will 
be developed. The correlation between the dependent 
variable and other independent variables in correlation 
matrix will show the degree of association of exchange 
rates with the dividend payment. 
As indicated before, one might think that in the 
periods of floating exchange rates the desired dividend 
* 
(D ) may not be a function of one explanatory variable 
(E). Rather it may be a function of earnings (E) and 
another explanatory variable, exchange rates. Suppose 
the optimal level of dividends depends on both the 
earnings levels and exchange rates. Thus at given 
earnings, one might expect dividends to move more or less 
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in step with exchange rates, but to react much more 
slowly to earnings changes. In Lintner's dividend 
payment model, the foreign exchange rates may enter to 
explain the intertemporal change of dividends of the 
foreign subsidiary. 
The foreign exchange rates may be added to Lintner's 
model in two ways. One way is to add the level of 
exchange rates to the desired dividend equation and the 
other is to add the changes in exchange rates to the 
adjustment equation. If we put the new variables in the 
desired dividend equation it may imply that the exchange 
rates affect the desired dividend itself, while if we put 
the new variables in the adjustment equation it may imply 
that they affect the adjustment rate at which a foreign 
subsidiary moves toward the target dividend D*. 
Adding the exchange rates to the target dividend 
equation, the relevant equations are : 
(13) D*t = rEt + B3EXt 
^t ~~ Dt-i = a + c(D £ - D-£_i) + Ut 
The reduced form is 
(15) Dt - Dt-1 = a + crEt - cDt_^ + CB3EX.1- + U^- 
Alternatively, 
(16) = a + crEj. + (l-c)D^._^ + cB^EX^. + U^ 
where EX = Annual average in units of foreign 
currencies per U.S. dollar, 
and Ut is an error term. 
Adding the changes in exchange rates to the 
adjustment equation, the relevant equations are : 
(17) D*t = rEt 
(18) Dt - Dt_1 = a + c(D*t - Dt_1) + B3 AEXt + Ut 
The reduced form is 
(19) Dfc - Dt_1 = a + crEt - cDt_1 + B3AEXt + Ut 
Alternatively, 
(20) Dfc = a + crEt + (l-c)Dt-l + B3 A EXt + Ut 
where EX = Annual average in units of foreign 
AEXt = 
currencies per U.S. dollar, 
EXt-EXt_i 
-  100 
EXt-l 
and Ut is an error term. 
Note that the reduced equation (16) is of the same 
form as the reduced equation (20), but has a different 
coefficient on the different specification of exchange 
rates. Both of these models will be used to test the 
null hypothesis II. Because our concern is to 
investigate the effect of exchange rates on the 
intracompany dividends, we are not only interested in the 
coefficient cB3 Qf the reduced equation (16), but in 
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the coefficient B0 _ , , , . 
3 of the reduced equation (20). Any 
interpretation of the absolute magnitude of the estimated 
parameters will be different between the two models. 
An alternative specification is using multiplicative 
instead of additive exchange rate variable. The exchange 
rate variable should enter not as level of exchange 
rates, but rather as ratios of current exchange rate to 
the exchange rate of the end of fixed exchanage rate, 
here year 1972; thus the relevant form would be exchange 
rate in period t as a ratio to the exchange rate in the 
base year 1972. This may allow an exchange rate which 
rose to a new permanent level to continue to have a 
permanent effect. Then the effect of exchanage rate 
changes could affect D* as follows: 
(21) 
(22) 
D*t = aErtHXBt 
__^t___ = ( _D*t 
Dt-1 Dt-1 
The reduced form is 
(23) D. 
-= ( 
aErtHX* t 
D 
t-1 
ft 
Dt-1 
If we take log on both sides, then 
(24) log Dt _ i0g Dt_1 = c(log aErtHXBt - log Dt-l)+logUt 
=cloga + crlogEt - clog Dt-1 + cB3logHXt + logUt 
Alternatively, 
(25) logD^ = cloga+crlogEt+(1-c)logDt_^+cB3logHXt+logUt 
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where EX = Annual average in units of foreign 
currencies per U.S. dollar, 
EX. 
HXt = 
EX 
1972 
and U is error term. 
The reduced form of equation (25) is the same form 
as the reduced equation (16) except the log form. Since 
equation (25) is double logarithmic, the coefficients 
represent elasticities. Thus the short run impact of 
dividend with respect to the ratio of exchange rates is 
cB3, while the long-run impact is to be B3 in 
equation (21). Here again, the reduced form of equation 
(25) will be used to test the hypothesis II. The 
interesting point is the significance of which 
really measures the effect of the exchange rates on the 
intracompany dividend payment. So long as the 
coefficient B^ not significantly different from 
zero, the effect of the exchange rates may not exist. 
(5) The Effect of Interest Rates 
on the Intracompany Dividends. 
The interest rates of the host countries and U.S. 
also influence the dividend payment decision of the U.S 
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owned foreign subsidiares. Logically the same as in the 
exchange rates, the desired dividends may not be just a 
function of one explanatory variable, that is, earnings. 
It may be a function of earnings and another explanatory 
variable, interest rates. If the optimal level of 
dividends depends on both the earnings and interest 
rates, then at given earnings dividends are expected to 
move more or less in step with the interest rates, but to 
react much more slowly to earnings changes. 
As is the same as the exchange rates, the first step 
is to add the interest rates of host countries to the 
desired dividend equation of Lintner's model. 
If the interest rates of the host countries affected 
the desired dividend D*, then the relevant equation 
would be: 
(26) D*t = rEt + B3It 
(27) Dt - Dt_1 = a + c(D*t - + Ut 
The reduced form is 
(28 ) D 
t " Dt-1 = a + crEt ” cDt-l + cB3It + Ut 
Alternatively, 
(29) Dt = a + crEt + (l-c)Dt_x + cB3It + Ut 
where I = Period average of treasury bill rates or 
short term money market rates of the host 
countries, 
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arid u is an error term. 
If the changes in the interest rates of the host 
countries affected the adjustment rate at which the 
subsidiaries moved toward the desired dividend D*, then 
the relevant equations become: 
(30) D*t = rEt 
(31) Dt _ Dt_1 = a + c(D*t - Dt-1) + B3AIt + Ut 
The reduced form is 
(32) - Dt-1 = a + crEt “ cDt-l + B3AIt + Ut 
Alternatively, 
(33) Dt = a + crEt + (i-c)Dt-l + B3^It + Ut 
where I = Period average of treasury bill rates or 
short term money market rates of the host 
countries, 
Alt = it - it-i 
and Ut is err0r term. 
The reduced equation (29) is of the same form as the 
reduced equation (33), but has a different coefficient on 
the changes in the interest rates. We are not only 
interested in the coefficient cB^ of the reduced 
equation (29), but in the coefficient B^ Gf the reduced 
equation (33). Any interpretation of the absolute 
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magnitude of the estimated parameters will be different 
between the two models. 
The second approach substitudes the changes in the 
ratio of the interest rates in the U.S. and host 
countries for the host country's interest rates. The 
inclusion of the U.S. interest rates may make sense 
because of the impact of parent company decision on the 
dividend and investment decision of the foreign 
subsidiaries due to the U.S. interest rates. Then the 
relevant equations are: 
(34) 
(35) 
D*t = aErt J^t 
Dt-1 Dt-1 
The reduced form 
(36) D 
is 
(55ft 
Dt-1 
)c Ut 
If we take log on both sides, then 
(37) log Dt - log Dt_^ = c(log aErtJ^_ - log Dt_^)+logUt 
=cloga + crlogE^ _ clog D^-_^ + cB3logJ-(: + logU-j- 
Alternatively, 
(38) logD^ = cloga+crlogE^.+(l~c) logD^__ ^+cB2 logJ^. + logU^. 
where J = Ratios of the host countries interest 
rates to the U.S. interest rates from 1972, 
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that 
and 
(972)Host Country 
is, Jt = ---) 
It/I1972)u‘s« 
I = Period average of treasury bill rates or 
short term money market rates of the host 
countries and the U.S., 
is an error term. 
The reduced equation is the same form as the reduced 
equation (29), but has a different coefficient on the 
interest rate term. Since equation (38) is double 
logarithmic, the coefficients represent elasticities. 
Thus the short-run elasticity of dividend with respect to 
the relative interest rates is cB^, while the long-run 
(or full adjustment) elasticity is seen from (34) to be 
g 
3. We are interested in the significance of the 
coefficient cB^ Qf the reduced equation (38). 
Third, real interest rates of the host country, 
i.e., interest rates corrected for inflation, may be 
substituded for nominal interest rates of the host 
country. Nominal interest rates which we actually see in 
the market will not separate the influence of inflation 
rates on the intracompany dividend payments. Hence, real 
interest rates would be a good substitute solving this 
irretrievable problem. The real interest rates can enter 
into the lagged adjustment model in two ways. 
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i) Additive form: added to the desired dividend 
equation 
(39) D*t = rEt + B3 RI. 
(40) Dt - Dt_1 = a + c(D*t - Dt_1) + Ut 
The reduced form is 
(41) - Dt_^ = a + crEt - cDt_^ + cB^ RIt + Ut 
Alternatively, 
(42) Dt = a + crEt + (l-c)Dt_1 + cB3 RIt + Ut 
where RI = Real interest rates of the host 
countries, 
that is, RIt = It . Apt, 
I = Period average of treasury bill rates or 
short term money market rates of the host 
countries, 
P = Annual average consumer price index of 
host countries, 
pt- pt-i Ap = - x ICO 
^ P 
^t-l 
and Ut is an error term. 
ii) Additive form: added to the adjustment equation 
(43) = rEn 
(44) Dt _ Dt_1 = a + c(D t - Dt-i) + B3 RIt + Ut 
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The reduced form is 
(45) Dt _ Dt_x = a + crEt - cDt_i + B3 RIt + Ut 
Alternatively, 
(46) Dfc = a + crEt + (l-c)Dt_1 + B3 RIt + Ut 
where RI = Real interest rates of the host 
countries, 
that is, RIt = it -APt, 
rei. iuu dveictyt; 
short term money market rates of the host 
countries, 
P = Annual average consumer price index of 
*pt = 
host countries, 
pt- pt-i 
x 100 
t-1 
and is an error term. 
The reduced equation (42) is of the same form as the 
reduced form (46), but has a different coefficient on the 
real interest term. In order to test the effect of real 
interest rates on the intracompany dividend payment, both 
models will be chosen. Hence, we are interested not only 
in the coefficient cB3 in equation (34) but also in the 
coefficient B^ Qf the desired dividend equation (39) 
and the coefficient B3 Qf the adjustment equation (44) 
which measure the effect of the real interest rates on 
the intracompany dividend payment. So long as the 
coefficient c is significantly different from zero, no 
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difference in interpretation of significance of 
statistical results occur except the absolute magnitude 
of the estimated parameters between the two models. 
Finally, the difference of real interest rates of 
the host country and U.S. may be used as the interest 
variable. This may both cure the analytical problem 
caused by inflation in the two countries and consider the 
U.S interest rates which surely affect the dividend 
policy of the parent company. The difference of real 
interest rates can enter into the lagged adjustment model 
in two ways. 
i) Additive form: added to the desired dividend 
equation. 
(47) D*t = rEt + B3 DIt 
(48> Dt - Dt_! = a + c(D*t - Dt-1) + Ut 
The reduced form is 
(49) = a + crEt “ cDt-l + cB3 DIt + Ut 
Alternatively, 
(50) Dt = a + crEt + (l-c)Dt_1 + cB3 DIt + Ut 
where DI = Difference between the real interest 
rates of the host country and U.S., 
that is, DI = RI Canada - RI U.S., 
RI = Real interest rates. 
80 
that is, RIt = it -Apt, 
I = Period average of treasury bill rates or 
short term money market rates. 
APt = 
P = Annual average consumer price index, 
Pt~ Pt-1 -1- x 100 
P 
t-1 
and is an error term. 
ii) Additive form: added to the adjustment equation 
(51) D*t = rEt 
(52) Dt __ Dt_1 = a + c(D*t - Dt-l) + B3 DIt + Ut 
The reduced form is 
(53) Dt _ Dt__1 = a + crEt - cDt_1 + B3 DIt + Ut 
Alternatively, 
(54) Dt = a + crEt + (1-c)Dt_i + B3 DIt + Ut 
where DI = Difference between the real interest 
rates of the host country and U.S., 
that is, DI = RI Canada - RI U.S., 
RI = Real interest rates, 
that is, RIt = It _Apt, 
I = Period average of treasury bill rates or 
short term money market rates, 
P = Annual average consumer price index, 
V pt-i 
AP = ---- x 100 
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and U . 
t is an error term. 
The reduced form of equation (50) is the same form 
as the reduced form (54), but has a different coefficient 
of the difference in real interest rates of Canada and 
U.S.. Both models will be used in order to test the 
hypothesis III. Hence, both the regression coefficient 
cB3 in equation (50) and B3 in equation (54) will be 
checked whether they are significantly different from 
zero or not. 
CHAPTER V 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
V-l Data 
(1) Sources 
Relevant accounting numbers of the U.S. owned 
foreign subsidiaries were obtained from Moody 's 
Industrial Manual ( 1964 - 1980) and Moody 's 
International Manual (1981-1982). The data for U.S. 
parent companies were also from Moody's Industrial 
Manual (1964-1982). The sample firms are basically 
non-financial subsidiaries. The list of subsidiaries in 
Moody's Industrial Manual (specifically in the section 
of foreign companies) is not exhaustive; there are 
approximately 40 U.S. owned foreign subsidiaries listed 
each year in the Manual. From 1981, a separate volume of 
Moody's International Manual has listed more U.S. owned 
foreign subsidiaries than before. 
The number of the U.S. subsidiaries in Canada is 29 
companies. As we see in TABLE 23 of the Appendix, most 
subsidiaries in Canada have more than 50% equity control 
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and complete information on all accounting numbers during 
the period (1964-1982). The U.S. subsidiaries in other 
than Canada, however, do not have enough accounting 
information during the period. The number of 
subsidiaries in other countries than Canada is 18 and 
most of these subsidiaries have complete information just 
during 1978-1982. The non-Canadian subsidiaries are 
listed in TABLE 33. These insufficient number (18) of 
subsidiaries in other countries than Canada and the short 
period (1978-1982) of these subsidiaries may reduce the 
reliability of the analysis. Only preliminary 
calculation of simple facts such as average payout ratio, 
standard deviation of the average payout ratio, and 
correlation between the payout ratios of parent company 
and subsidiary will be made on the non-Canadian 
subsidiaries. Hence most of the statistical tests of 
hypotheses and the interpretation of the results will 
concentrate on the U.S. owned Canadian subsidiaries. 
(2) Time Period 
Annual data from 1964 to 1982 are obtained from 
financial statement of each subsidiary and parent company 
in Moody's Industrial Manual and Moody's International 
Manual. Fiscal year of each company may vary but only 
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those firms whose fiscal years are the same as calendar 
years are selected. 
(3) Types of Cases 
Firm specific data are obtained from the financial 
statement of each subsidiary and parent company. 
Relevant accounting numbers are as follows ;(All 
accounting numbers are expressed in host country currency 
except number of shares and ownership percentage.) 
1. Net Income, 2. (Total) Dividends for common stocks, 
3.Number of shares, 4. Earnings per share, 5. Dividend 
per share, 6. Depreciation, 7. The percentage of U.S. 
equity ownership. 
The foreign exchange rates, interest rates, and 
inflation rates of host countries which influence the 
dividend payout of the U.S. owned foreign subsidiaries 
are obtained from International Financial Statistics 
published by IMF. All the information on these 
financial variables are in TABLE 38. The foreign 
exchange rates are period average in units of foreign 
currencies per U.S. dollar. The interest rates of host 
countries are period average short term money market 
rates or 90 days treasury bill rates. The inflation 
rates of host countries and the U.S. are measured in 
terms of consumer price index. 
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V-2 Results of Preliminary Tests 
(1) Average Payout Ratio 
The U.S owned Canadian subsidiaries have lower 
payout ratio than their U.S. parent companies. Referring 
to TABLE 5, the average payout ratio of all 29 U.S. owned 
Canadian subsidiaries during the past 18 years is 36.57%, 
while that of U.S. parent companies is 50.94%. But the 
variability (coefficient of variation) in average payout 
ratio of the U.S. parent companies is 1.60 which is 
greater than that (0.93) of the U.S. owned Canadian 
subsidiaries. The U.S. owned Canadian subsidiaries tend 
to have more stable dividend payment behavior than their 
U.S. parent companies. 
The average payout ratio of the U.S. owned Canadian 
subsidiaries during the periods of fixed exchange rates 
is much higher than during the periods of floating 
exchange rates. Furthermore, during the periods of fixed 
exchange rates, the payout ratio is more stable than 
during the periods of floating exchange rates. The 
smaller average payout ratio and higher variability 
(coefficient of variation) in average payout ratio during 
the periods of floating exchange rates may imply that the 
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subsidiaries are more flexible in adjusting their 
dividend payment during the periods of volatile exchange 
rates and other factors such as exchange rates and 
interest rates will influence the dividend payment 
behavior of the foreign subsidiaries. The results of 
preliminary tests on the sample companies are in TABLE 26 
through TABLE 29. 
In order to find out whether this kind of 
relationship between parent companies and subsidiaries 
can be generalized, the U.S. owned non-Canadian 
subsidiaries are collected and given the same preliminary 
tests. As we see in TABLE 6, in contrast to the average 
payout ratio of the U.S. owned Canadian subsidiaries, the 
average payout ratio of the non Canadian subsidiaries is 
greater than that of their parent companies. It might be 
due to the fact that the data set consist of different 
countries and very short time periods (usually from 1978 
to 1982). But it is clear that the coefficient of 
variation in average payout ratio of the non Canadian 
subsidiaries is smaller than that of parent companies. 
It implies that the subsidiaries have more stable 
dividend payment ratio than the parent companies. 
Unlike the Canadian subsidiaries, however, the 
variability in average payout ratio of the non-Canadian 
subsidiaries is greater during the periods of fixed 
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exchange rates than during the periods of floating 
exchange rates. But again given so small number of 
observations per each country and so short periods 
(1978-1982) per each subsidiary, the result is somewhat 
suspect as sample and time specific. Even though the 
result here is opposite to the case of the Canadian 
subsidiaries, it might not be suspect that during the 
periods of floating exchange rates the subsidiaries tend 
to have higher variability in payment behavior than 
during the periods of fixed exchange rates. The results 
of preliminary tests on sample companies are in TABLE 35 
through TABLE 37. 
The same preliminary tests were also done on cash 
flow basis for the the U.S. owned Canadian subsidiaries. 
Depreciation, depletion, and amortization allowances are 
sources of funds in a company. Brittain (1966) was the 
first to use cash flow (net income plus depreciation, 
depletion, and amortization allowances) or to use net 
income and allowances separately as the measure of a 
firm's ability to pay dividends. 
As we see in TABLE 7, the average payout ratio of 
the U.S. owned Canadian subsidiaries on cash flow basis 
is lower than that of the parent companies on cash flow 
basis. The average payout ratio of both the subsidiaries 
and parent companies have more stable dividend payment 
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record on cash flow basis than on net income basis. The 
distinct feature is the lower coefficient of variation in 
average payout ratio of parent companies on cash flow 
basis than that of the subsidiaries. This is the 
opposite to the net income basis and implies that the 
subsidiaries are more willing to adjust depreciation 
allowances as a source of funds. The results of 
preliminary tests on sample companies are in TABLE 31 and 
TABLE 32. 
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TABLE 5 
Average Payout Ratio of U.S. owned Canadian 
Subsidiaries and their Parent Companies 
Number of Average Standard C.V. 
Samples Payout 
Ratio 
Deviation ★ 
U.S. Parent Companies 418 50.94 81.25 1.60 
Canadian Subsidiaries - 
All Samples 418 36.57 34.07 .93 
Fixed Exchange Rates 173 43.49 34.63 .80 
Floating Exchange Rates 233 31.07 32.66 1.05 
* C.V. = Coefficient of Variation 
= Standard Deviation / Average Payout Ratio. 
TABLE 6 
Average Payout Ratio of U.S . owned Non-Canadian 
Subsidiaries and their Parent Companies 
Number of Average Standard C.V. 
Samples Payout Deviation * 
Ratio 
U.S. Parent Companies 130 46.05 56.86 1.23 
Non-Canadian Subsidiaries - 
All Samples 130 59.59 53.85 .90 
Fixed Exchange Rates 45 59.23 56.99 . 9 6 
Floating Exchange Rates 85 59.78 52.46 .88 
* C.V. = Coefficient of Variation 
= Standard Deviation / Average Payout Ratio. 
90 
TABLE 7 
Average Payout 
Subsidiaries 
(On 
Ratio of U.S. owned Canadian 
and their Parent Companies 
Cash Flow Basis) 
Number of Average Standard C.V. 
Samples Payout Deviation * 
Ratio 
U.S. Parent Companies 383 25.81 11.01 .43 
Canadian Subsidiaries - 
All Samples 
Fixed Exchange Rates 
Floating Exchange Rates 
383 20.19 11.39 .56 
173 43.49 34.63 .80 
233 31.07 32.66 1.05 
* C.V. Coefficient of Variation 
Standard Deviation / Average Payout Ratio. 
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(2) Correlation between parents' payout 
and subsidiaries' payout ratio 
Referring to TABLE 8, TABLE 24 and TABLE 30, the low 
correlation between parents' payout ratio and 
subsidiaries' payout ratio might suggest that the 
subsidiaries do not follow parents' payout ratio. 
Previous surveys by Zenoff (1968) and Robbins and 
Stobaugh (1973) revealed the importance attached to the 
parent company's payout ratio in determining dividends to 
be received from abroad. But the two surveys were done 
during the periods of fixed exchange rates when the 
foreign subsidiaries did not need to be concerned about 
exchange rates. During the periods of floating exchange 
rates, the parent companies seem to no longer require the 
subsidiaries to follow parents' target payout ratio. 
This finding suggests that the U.S. owned foreign 
subsidiaries do not follow the dividend policy of their 
U.S. parent companies. 
As we see in TABLE 24 and TABLE 30, the correlation 
between parents' payout and subsidiaries' payout ratio on 
cash flow basis is in general much higher than on net 
income basis (0.28 versus 0.04). This shows that the 
subsidiaries have similar payout behavior on cash flow 
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basis. The parent companies may establish target payout 
ratio not on net income basis but on cash flow basis. 
TABLE 8 
Distribution of Correlation 
Between U.S. Parent's Payout and 
Canadian Subsidiary's Payout Ratio 
(On Net Income Basis) 
Correlation All Percentage 
Range Companies of All 
Companies 
1.00 - .80 1 3% 
.80 - .61 4 14 
.60 - .41 5 17 
.40 - .21 5 17 
.20 - 0 14 48 
Total 29 100% 
TABLE 9 
Distribution of Correlation 
Between U.S. Parent's Payout and 
Canadian Subsidiary's Payout Ratio 
(On Cash Flow Basis) 
Correlation All Percentage 
Range Companies of All 
Companies 
1.00 - .80 3 11% 
.80 - .61 3 11 
.60 - .41 2 7 
.40 - .21 7 25 
.20 - 0 13 46 
Total 28 100% 
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(3) Correlation between earnings and dividends 
Referring to TABLE 25 in Appendix, 23 out of 29 U.S. 
owned Canadian subsidiaries have positive correlation 
between net income and dividends, two subsidiaries (Union 
Oil and Warnaco) have negative correlation, and two 
subsidiaries - Superior Oil and Murphy Oil - have zero 
correlation (meaning that they did not pay anything at 
all) during the whole period. Positive correlation 
between net income and dividends implies that dividends 
are positively associated with earnings during the 
periods. Two subsidiaries, Safeway Canada and Crown Cork 
and Seal, did have equal dividend amounts during the 
whole period. They did not change dividends at all for 
the whole 18 years. 
Most of the U.S. parent companies have high positive 
correlations between net income and dividends. Only 
General Dynamics had negative correlation between 
earnings and dividends while Crown Cork and Seal and 
Teledyne did not pay any dividends at all during 
1964-1982. 
Given the high initial fixed cost and fluctuating 
oil price, it can be understood that the oil subsidiaries 
(Superior Oil, Union Oil, and Murphy Oil) have highly 
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unusual dividend payment behavior than any other 
subsidiaries. 
(4) Summary of Preliminary Tests 
The U.S. owned foreign subsidiaries have more stable 
dividend payment records than their U.S. parent 
companies. It seems that the subsidiaries are more stuck 
to the continuity of dividend policy than their U.S. 
parent companies. The intracompany dividend policy may 
be more focused on the consistency that is designed to 
show that these payments are necessary and legitimate 
business expenses. From the view point of host 
countries, the host countries are firm to limit the size 
of the dividend remittances as a percentage of earnings. 
This difference in consistency of payment records between 
the subsidiaries and their U.S. parents is further 
supported by the fact that the U.S. owned foreign 
subsidiaries do not follow their U.S. parent companies' 
dividend payout policy. There is a great difference in 
payment behavior of the U.S. owned foreign subsidiaries 
during the periods of fixed exchange rates and floating 
exchange rates. The level of dividends are highly 
associated with the level of earnings in the U.S. owned 
foreign subsidiaries. 
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V-3 Empirical Model Tested 
The statistical tests are done only for the Canadian 
subsidiaries on net income basis. The correlation 
between net income and cash flow is very high (.95), 
hence there is no need to do the anlysis on cash flow 
basis. The data of non-Canadian subsidiaries are very 
small, sample and time specific, and they contain no 
useful information hence no statistical tests will be 
done using them. 
(1) Lintner's Model and Extension 
At first, Lintner's partial adjustment model was 
applied to all sample observations of 29 Canadian 
subsidiaries during 1964-1982. Referring to the results 
in TABLE 10, Lintner's model explained 72% of variation 
of the regression (r2 is .72), and adjustment rate was 
.50 which means that the Canadian subsidiaries adjusted 
50 cent out of 1 dollar net increase of dividends. The 
constant term was positive and statistically significant. 
During the same periods, the U.S. parent companies have 
adjustment rate of .21 and R-square was .33. 
The adjustment rate of .72 during the periods of 
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fixed exchange rates may imply that the subsidiaries are 
relatively aggressive in adjusting to higher earnings 
while the small adjustment rate of .35 during the periods 
of floating exchange rates will show that the 
subsidiaries are relatively reluctant to change 
dividends. This phenomenon might imply more frequent use 
of transfer instruments such as transfer prices, 
invoicing, and compensating balance during the periods of 
floating exchange rates. This finding also explains why 
average payout ratio is higher during the periods of 
fixed exchange rates than during the periods of floating 
exchange rates. 
In order to test the null hypothesis that the U.S. 
owned foreign subsidiaries have the same payment behavior 
during the periods of fixed and floating exchange rates, 
Chow test was used. Chow test is given in the following 
form. 
SSE(R) - SSE(F) SSE(F) 
F - /- 
- dfp dfp 
This is distributed at F(dfR-dfF, dfp; .95). 
Here SSE(R) is the sum of squared residuals on 
fitting Lintner^s model to the combined sample, SSE(F) is 
obtained by adding the sum of squared residuals of 
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Lintner s model on each sample of fixed and floating 
exchange rates, and df is degree of freedom. 
Specifically, 
143 - 118 118 
F = /-= 25.49 
3 361 
where, SSE(F) = 118 = 70 +48 
SSE(R) = 143 
= 151 + 216 - 3 = 364 
dfF = (151-3) + (216-3) = 361 
The critical value is found to be 2.37. So we 
reject the null hypothesis that the U.S. owned Canadian 
subsidiaries have the same payment behavior during the 
periods of fixed and floating exchange rates. 
Having demonstrated that the regression coefficients 
for the two regimes were indeed different, we now turn to 
test whether the variables such as exchange rates and 
interest rates might be important during the periods of 
floating exchange rates. Lintner's model is shown above 
to have significantly different values for parameter 
estimates in the fixed exchange rate period, compared to 
the floating exchange rate period. It may be that the 
difference is due to the one or all of the financial 
variables such as fluctuating exchange rates, higher 
interest rates and inflation rates during the periods of 
floating exchange rates, not considered in the F test for 
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Lintner equation. 
Referring to the F value in TABLE 12 and 15, we 
reject the null hypothesis that there is no linear 
relationship between the dependent variable and the 
entire set of independent variables. As we see in TABLE 
11 and 14, the correlation matrix shows the correlation 
between the dependent variable (D) and each independent 
variable as well as the correlation between the 
independent variables. Note small correlation between 
the independent variables except that between the level 
of interest rates and inflation rates, hence 
multicolinearity may not be significant in this multiple 
regression analysis. But, no new independent variables 
of levels and changes of exchange rates, interest rates, 
and inflation rates are highly correlated with the 
dividend payment. 
TABLE 13 and 16 show the statistics for the 
independent variables. The partial regression 
coefficient of changes in interest rate variable in TABLE 
16 is significantly different from zero at 5% of 
significance level for a 1-tail test. A 1-tail test 
instead of 2-tail test is used because the regression 
coefficient of interest rate variable in alternative form 
of hypothesis III is hypothesized negative. Hence, the 
change in interest rates is found to be important in the 
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TABLE 10 
Regression Results of Lintner's Model 
Lintner's 
MODEL : Dt = a + crEt +(l-c)Dt-l + Ut 
(EQ. 4) (Ut is an error term) 
U.S Parents 
and Canadian 
Subsidiaries 
Sample 
Size 
a 
(t-value) 
cr 
★ 
(1-0 R2 c SSE 
★ ★ 
U.S. Parent 
Companies 
379 0.04 0.09 
(1.98) (12.54) 
0.79 
(9.49) 
0.32 0.21 150 
U.S. owned 
Canadian 
Subsidiaries 
All Periods 
Subsidiaries 
367 0.10 
(2.18) 
0.13 
(13.65) 
0.50 
(16.23) 
0.72 0.50 143 
Fixed Exchange 151 
Rate Periods 
0.30 
(4.03) 
0.13 
(9.62) 
0.28 
(5.29) 
0.64 0.72 70 
Floating 
Exchange 
Rate Periods 
216 -0.12 
(-2.50) 
0.16 
(13.55) 
0.65 
(20.86) 
0.85 0.35 48 
* 5% of significance level 
** Sum of Squared Errors 
TABLE 11 
Correlation Matrix of Equation 
(Floating Exchange Rate Period) 
D E DLAG EX I 
D 1 
E .74 1 
DLAG .85 .50 1 
EX .03 -.03 .04 1 
I -.05 -.06 -.03 .12 1 
CHP -.06 -.05 I . o
 
o>
 in 
o
 • l .67 
D Dividend per share 
E Earnings per share 
DLAG Lagged dividend 
EX Level of exchange rate 
I Level of interest rate 
CHP Changes in price level 
CHP 
1 
TABLE 12 
Statistics and Analysis of Variance 
of Equation (8) 
R-square : .8503 
Adjusted R-square: .8467 
Standard Error : .4773 
F-value (5,210;.95) - 238.56 
TABLE 13 
Statistics for Variables 
in Equation (8) 
Variable Estimated 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
t 
Statis 
Constant -.2448 .2709 -.904 
E .1573 .0117 13.458 
DLAG . 6478 .0314 20.648 
EX .1030 . 1361 .757 
I -.0065 .0131 -.499 
CHP . 0079 . 0283 . 279 
TABLE 14 
Correlation Matrix of Equation (12) 
(Floating Exchange Rate Period) 
D E DLAG CHEX CHI CHP DCHG 
D 1 
E . 74 1 
DLAG .85 .50 1 
CHEX .02 -.03 .04 1 
CHI .02 .14 .01 -.35 1 
CHP -.06 -.05 -.06 -.04 . 13 1 
DCHG .31 .42 -.20 -.00 .03 -.01 1 
D Dividend per share 
E Earnings per share 
DLAG Lagged dividend 
CHEX Changes in exchange rates 
cm Changes in interest rates 
CHP Changes in price level 
DCHG Changes in dividend 
TABLE 15 
Statistics and Analysis of Variance 
of Equation (12) 
R-square : .8521 
Adjusted R-square: .8485 
Standard Error : .4745 
F-value (5,210;.95) = 241.91 
TABLE 16 
Statistics for Variables 
in Equation (12) 
Variable Estimated 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
t 
Statis 
Constant -.1272 . 2065 -.616 
E . 1604 .0117 13.659 
DLAG . 6449 .0312 20.664 
CHEX -.0006 . 0098 -.057 
CHI -.0268 .0157 -1.703 
CHP . 0029 . 0209 . 140 
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intracompany dividend payment. More extension of 
interest rate variable is made in order to further check 
the effect of interest rates on the dividend payment of 
Canadian subsidiaries. 
In the following section, the result of statistical 
tests where only exchange rate variable alone was 
considered in the extended model of Lintner's equation 
are explained. 
(2) The Effect of Exchange Rates 
On The Intracompany Dividends 
In the models tested, the essential concern is 
whether the regression coefficient of exchange rate 
variable is significantly different from zero or not. 
Fitting the reduced equations of (16), (20) and (24) into 
the data set of the Canadian subsidiaries during the 
periods of floating exchange rates (216 observations) 
resulted in the finding that the regression coefficients 
B3 and cB3 of exchange rate variables in the two 
models were not statistically significant at the 
significance level of 5%. The regression coefficients 
are reported in TABLE 17 and 18. 
Possible reason of these results may be due to the 
fact that the accounting numbers (net income and 
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TABLE 17 
Regression Results of Additive Form 
(EX : Exchange Rates, 
EXt - EXt-1 
A EX =-x 100, and 
EXt-1 
Ut is an error term) 
MODEL : Dt = a + crEt + (l-c)Dt-l + cB3 EXt + Ut 
(EQ. 16) 
U.S. owned Sample a cr 1-c cB3 
Canadian Size (t-value)* 
Subsidiaries 
Floating 
Exchange 216 -0.22 0.16 
Rate Periods (-1.42) (13.54) 
0.65 
(20.75) 
0.01 
(.56) 
* 5% of significance level 
MODEL : Dt = a + crEt + (l-c)Dt-l + B3£EXt + Ut 
(EQ. 20) 
U.S. owned Sample 
Canadian Size 
Subsidiaries 
a cr 
(t-value)* 
1-c B3 
Floating 
Exchange 216 -0.13 0.16 0.65 0.09 
Rate Periods (-2.50) (13.53) (20.76) (.08) 
* 5% of significance level 
R2 
0.85 
R2 
0.85 
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TABLE 18 
Regression Results of Multiplicative Form 
(EX : Exchange Rates, 
HXt : Ratio of Exchange Rate frcm 1972, 
EXt 
=-, and 
EX 1972 
Ut is an error term) 
MODEL : logDt = cloga + crlogEt + (1-c)logDt-1 + cB31ogHXt + logUt 
(EQ. 24) 
U.S. owned Sample 
Canadian Size 
Subsidiaries 
(t-value)* 
a cr 1-c cB3 R2 
Floating 
Exchange 
Rate Periods 
216 -0.33 
(-4.83) 
.30 0.61 -0.21 0.68 
(6.94) (11.47) (-.54) 
* 5% of significance level 
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dividends) are annual figures rather than monthly or 
quarterly hence the accounting information may not have 
captured the daily movement of exchange rates. 
The fact that the regression results did not show 
the importance of exchange rate variable even under the 
floating exchange rates might suggest that another 
mechanism of moving money such as transfer pricing is 
very likely to incorporate the changes in exchange rates. 
(3) The Effect of Interest Rates 
On The Intracompany Dividends 
In order to investigate the effect of interest rates 
of host countries and U.S. on the intracompany dividend 
payment, two kinds of model are introduced, additive and 
multiplicative form. The level of interest rates entered 
into the desired dividend equation, and the changes of 
interest rates entered into the adjustment equation. 
Relative interest rates between Canada and U.S. entered 
into the desired dividend equation. The Canadian real 
interest rates in each period and difference in real 
interest rates between Canada and U.S., respectively were 
added to both the desired dividend equation and the 
adjustment equation. The point is to investigate whether 
the regression coefficients of the various kinds of 
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interest variables are significantly different from zero 
or not. 
The results of fitting the data set into the reduced 
form of equations are in TABLE 19 through TABLE 22. 
Referring to the results in TABLE 19, one notices 
significant regression coefficient of changes in interest 
rate variable from equation (33). The sign of the 
regression coefficient is negative which was postulated 
in this study. This statistical result supports the 
alternative hypothesis III that increase in the interest 
rate of Canada would decrease the dividend payment while 
decrease in the interest rates of Canada would raise the 
dividend payment of the U.S. owned Canadian subsidiaries. 
The absolute magnitude of B3 in equation (33) during 
the floating exchange rate periods implies .03 dollar (3 
cents) decrease of actual dividend amount per one 
percentage point increase of interest rates in Canada. 
The result suggests that managers of the subsidiaries are 
more sensitive to the movement of interest rates than 
exchange rates. 
TABLE 20 presents the statistically insignificant 
value of regression coefficient of interest rate variable 
which is the ratio of Canadian interest rates to U.S. 
interest rates from 1972. It means that the relative 
interest rates between Canada and U.S. are not important 
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in explaining the dividend payment behavior of the U.S. 
owned Canadian subsidiaries. Because the correlation 
between Canadian interest rates and U.S. interest rates 
was very high (the correlation was .94), this form of 
interest variable did not capture much of the information 
from the regression. 
TABLE 21 shows insignificant regression coefficient 
of real interest rate variable in equation (42) and (46). 
Considering the Canadian interest rates in relation to 
Canadian inflation rates did not explain much the 
dividend payment behavior of U.S. owned Canadian 
subsidiaries. 
A final look at TABLE 22 confirms the findings in 
previous case. When we considered both the interest 
rates and inflation rates of Canada and U.S., the 
regression coefficients of the difference in real 
interest rates between the two countries were not 
statistically different from zero. 
Among the results of various interest rate variable, 
the additive form with the changes in Canadian interest 
rates added to the adjustment equation of Lintner's model 
was good in explaining the dividend payment behavior of 
U.S. owned Canadian subsidiaries during the periods of 
floating exchange rates. 
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TABLE 19 
Regression Results of Additive Form 
(I : Short Term Interest Rates of Canada, 
Alt = 
Ut is 
It - It-1 
an error 
, and 
term) 
MODEL : 
(EQ. 29) 
Dt = a + crEt + (1 -c)Dt-l + cB3 It + Ut 
U.S. owned 
Canadian 
Subsidiaries 
Sample 
Size 
a 
(t-value) 
cr 
* 
1-c cB3 R2 
All Periods 367 0.23 
(0.56) 
0.13 
(13.23) 
0.35 
(16.19) 
-0.02 
(-.50) 
0.72 
Fixed Exchange 151 
Rate Periods 
0.07 
(0.13) 
0.13 
(7.45) 
0.22 
(5.12) 
.00 
(.01) 
0.64 
Floating 
Exchange 
216 -0.09 
(-.82) 
0.16 
(13.49) 
0.65 
(20.82) 
-.00 
(-.34) 
0.85 
Rate Periods 
* 5% of significance level 
MODEL : 
(EQ. 33) 
Dt = a + crEt + (1 -c)Dt-l + B3AIt + Ut 
U.S. owned 
Canadian 
Subsidiaries 
Sample 
Size 
a 
(t-value) 
cr 
* 
1-c B3 R2 
All Periods 367 0.10 
(2.17) 
0.13 
(13.63) 
0.50 
(16.21) 
-0.01 
(-.59) 
0.72 
Fixed Exchange 151 
Rate Periods 
0.30 
(4.01) 
0.13 
(9.58) 
0.28 
(5.27) 
.00 
(.02) 
0.64 
Floating 
Exchange 
Rate Periods 
216 -1.00 
(-2.04) 
0.16 
(13.73) 
0.64 
(20.78) 
-0.03 
(-1.80) 
0.85 
* 5% of significance level 
TABLE 20 
MODEL : logDt 
(EQ. 38) 
U.S. owned 
Canadian 
Subsidiaries 
Floating 
Exchange 
Rate Periods 
Sunmary of Regression Results 
(I : Short Term Interest Rates, 
J : Ratio of the ratio of Canadian interest rates 
to that of U.S. interest rates from 1972, 
(It / 11972) Canada 
=-, and 
(It / 11972) U.S. 
Ut is an error term) 
= cloga + crlogEt + (1-c)logDt-1 + cB31ogJt + logUt 
Sample a cr 1-c cB3 R2 
Size (t-value)* 
216 -0.42 0.31 0.61 
(-5.65) (7.13) (11.54) 
0.19 0.68 
(1.21) 
* 5% of significance level 
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TABLE 21 
Regression Results of Additive Form 
(I : Short Term Interest Rates of Canada, 
P : Annual average Consumer Price Index, 
RI : Real Interest Rates 
Pt - Pt-1 
= It --xlOO, and 
Pt-1 
Ut is an error term) 
MODEL : Dt = a + 
(EQ. 42) 
crEt + (1- -c)Dt-l + cB3RIt + Ut 
U.S. owned 
Canadian 
Subsidiaries 
Sample 
Size 
a 
(t-value) 
cr 
* 
1-c cB3 R2 
All Periods 367 0.10 
(2.19) 
0.13 
(13.60) 
0.50 
(16.21) 
-.00 
(-.25) 
0.72 
Fixed Exchange 
Rate Periods 
151 0.29 
(3.89) 
0.13 
(9.58) 
0.28 
(5.27) 
.00 
(.06) 
0.64 
Floating 
Exchange Rate 
Periods 
216 -0.12 
(-2.43) 
0.16 
(13.48) 
0.65 
(20.81) 
-.00 
(-.24) 
0.85 
* 5% of significance level 
MODEL : Dt = a + 
(EQ. 46) 
crEt + (1 -c)Dt-l + B3RIt + Ut 
U.S. owned 
Canadian 
Subsidiaries 
Sample 
Size 
a 
(t-value) 
cr 
* 
1-c B3 R2 
All Periods 367 0.10 
(2.19) 
0.13 
(13.60) 
0.50 
(16.21) 
-.00 
(-.25) 
0.72 
Fixed Exchange 
Rate Periods 
151 0.29 
(3.89) 
0.13 
(9.58) 
0.28 
(5.27) 
.00 
(.06) 
0.64 
Floating 
Exchange Rate 
216 -0.12 
(-2.43) 
0.16 
(13.48) 
0.65 
(20.81) 
-.00 
(-.24) 
0.85 
Periods 
* 5% of significance level 
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TABLE 22 
Regression Results of Additive Form 
(I : Short Term Interest Rates of Canada and U.S., 
P : Annual average Consumer Price Index, 
RI : Real Interest Rates 
Pt - Pt-1 
= It-xlOO, 
Pt-1 
DI = RI Canada - RI U.S., and 
Ut is an error term) 
MODEL : Dt = a + 
(EQ. 50) 
crEt + (1 -c)Dt-l + cB3DIt Ut 
U.S. owned 
Canadian 
Subsidiaries 
Sample 
Size 
a 
(t-value) 
cr 
* 
1-c cB3 R2 
All Periods 367 0.10 
(2.12) 
0.13 
(13.62) 
0.50 
(16.21) 
-.00 
(-.04) 
0.72 
Fixed Exchange 
Rate Periods 
151 0.29 
(4.20) 
0.13 
(9.53) 
0.28 
(5.26) 
.00 
(-1.25) 
0.64 
Floating 
Exchange Rate 
Periods 
216 -0.12 
(-2.31) 
0.16 
(13.49) 
0.65 
(20.82) 
-0.01 
(-.48) 
0.85 
* 5% of significance level 
MODEL : Dt = a + 
(EQ. 54) 
crEt + (1 -c)Dt-l + B3DIt + Ut 
U.S. owned 
Canadian 
Subsidiaries 
Sample 
Size 
a 
(t-value) 
cr 
* 
1-c B3 R2 
All Periods 367 0.10 
(2.12) 
0.13 
(13.62) 
0.50 
(16.21) 
-.00 
(-.04) 
0.72 
Fixed Exchange 
Rate Periods 
151 0.31 
(4.20) 
0.13 
(9.53) 
0.28 
(5.26) 
-.06 
(-1.25) 
0.64 
Floating 
Exchange Rate 
216 -0.12 
(-2.31) 
0.16 
(13.49) 
0.65 
(20.82) 
-.00 
(-.48) 
0.85 
Periods 
* 5% of significance level 
CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
VI-1 Summary and Conclusions 
This study investigates the dividend payment 
behavior of the U.S. owned foreign subsidiaries on 
cross-sectional and time-series basis from 1964 to 1982. 
The implication of this study is that by understanding 
the dividend policy or model of behavior of the U.S. 
owned foreign subsidiaries in the changing environments 
of the host countries, financial manager of the U.S. 
parent company can better forecast the future dividend 
payment and financing needs. Also investors in U.S. can 
forecast the influence of the exchange rates, interest 
rates, and inflation rates of the host countries and U.S. 
on earnings and dividends of the parent companies. 
Because the dividend decision is the other side of a coin 
of financing decision, management can have a better idea 
on how much money they need for the investment project 
both in the U.S. parent companies and foreign 
subsidiaries. 
The factors which are assumed to influence the 
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dividend decision of the foreign subsidiaries are host 
and home country's corporation income tax rates, 
withholding tax rates, exchange rates, interest rates and 
inflation rates of the host countries and U.S., currency 
control, parent company's target dividend payout ratio, 
and the degree of ownership. The U.S. foreign exchange 
rate system has been changed from the fixed exchange 
rates to the floating exchange rates as of 1973. This 
change introduced the wholly new dimension into the 
financial management of multinational corporations. 
Transfer of financial flows between U.S. and host 
countries got enormous attention since then. 
The Canadian subsidiaries had all the information 
needed for the study while the subsidiaries other than 
Canada had not all the information. The data set of 
other than the Canadian subsidiaries are grouped into 
non-Canadian subsidiaries because the number of the 
subsidiaries per host country is small and the periods 
per subsidiary are short. Therefore the main hypotheses 
are tested with the Canadian subsidiaries. 
The main model used here is Lintner's partial 
adjustment model. In the time-series study, every 
observation of each subsidiary in each period is dealt 
with independently, hence all the observations are 
pooled. 
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In the empirical study, the preliminary facts such 
as average payout ratio, standard deviation, and 
coefficient of variation in average payout ratio are at 
first investigated. 
Next, correlations between the U.S. parent 
companies' payout ratios and their foreign subsidiaries' 
payout ratios are calculated . in order to investigate what 
kind of relationship there is in the payment behavior 
between the U.S. parent companies and their foreign 
subsidiaries. 
The correlations between earning and dividends are 
also calculated for each subsidiary in order to see 
whether dividends are always related to earnings. 
For the U.S. owned Canadian subsidiaries, all these 
preliminary tests are also done on cash flow basis. 
Depreciation allowances are supposed to influence the 
dividend payment decision of the foreign subsidiaries 
hence cash flow which is net income plus depreciation 
allowances is used in order to see whether it would be a 
better variable than the net income in explaining the 
dividend payment behavior of the foreign subsidiaries. 
All these preliminary tests are also done with the 
non-Canadian subsidiaries except on cash flow basis 
because the information on depreciation allowances is not 
available. 
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The interesting findings from the preliminary tests 
are as follows: First, the U.S. owned foreign 
subsidiaries have more stable dividend payment records 
than their U.S. parent companies. Second, the U.S. owned 
foreign subsidiaries do not follow their U.S. parent 
companies' dividend payout policy. The correlations 
between the payout ratios of the U.S. parent companies 
and their foreign subsidiaries are very low. Third, 
there is a great difference in payment behavior of the 
U.S. owned foreign subsidiaries during the periods of 
fixed exchange rates and during the periods of floating 
exchange rates. Finally, the level of dividends is 
highly associated with the level of earnings in U.S. 
owned foreign subsidiaries. 
Next, Lintner's partial adjustment model was applied 
to all samples of the U.S. owned Canadian subsidiaries 
and their U.S. parent companies, respectively. 
Adjustment rates and R-squares of Lintner's model were 
given special attention and compared to each other in the 
contrasting data groups such as subsidiaries versus 
parent companies, and the periods of fixed exchange rates 
versus floating exchange rates. In order to find out the 
difference in the payment behavior during the periods of 
fixed and floating exchange rates, Chow test was used to 
further investigate whether there is a real difference in 
118 
the dividend payment behavior. The statistical result 
showed different payment behavior between the periods of 
fixed and floating exchange rates. 
F test was used in order to check whether there was 
a linear association between the dividend payment and 
other independent variables such as exchange rates, 
interest rates, and inflation rates. The F test showed 
the linear relationship between the dividend payment and 
other independent variables. But the correlation between 
the dividned payment and any of the new independent 
variables was very low. But the regression coefficient 
of changes in interest rates was significantly different 
from zero. 
Even though the correlation between the dividend 
payment and the levels or changes in the exchange rates 
was low, exchange rates alone entered into Lintner's 
model in order to test the null hypothesis that the 
exchange rate does not affect the dividend payment 
decision of the U.S. owned foreign subsidiaries. In 
order to investigate the influence of exchange rates on 
the dividend payment behavior of the U.S. owned foreign 
subsidiaries, the levels of exchange rates were added to 
the desired dividend payment equation and the changes in 
exchange rates were added to the adjustment equation in 
Lintner's model. And the ratios of exchange rates from 
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1972 entered into Lintner's model in the multiplicative 
form. In the data set of the Canadian subsidiaries 
during the periods of floating exchange rates, the 
regression coefficients of the exchange rates both in the 
additive and multiplicative models were not statistically 
significant. Even though the regression results showed 
that the subsidiaries did not seem to adjust their 
dividend payments to the exchange rates, the results will 
not be strong enough to be generalized because of the 
annual accounting numbers instead of monthly or quarterly 
accounting figures of the sample firms. An implication 
of these results is that changes in dividends may not be 
affected by changes in exchange rates since transfer 
pricing is very likely to incorporate these changes in 
order to maintain a fairly constant real value of 
repatriated dividends. 
In order to find out the influence of the interest 
rates of the host countries on the dividend payment 
decision of the U.S. owned foreign subsidiaries, various 
kinds of interest rate variables entered into the partial 
adjustment model either in the additive or multiplicative 
form. The regression results showed that only the 
regression coefficient of changes in interest rates was 
statistically significant in the data set of the U.S. 
owned Canadian subsidiaries during the periods of 
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floating exchanage rates. The regression coefficients of 
other interest rate variables either in the additive or 
multiplicative form were not statistically different from 
zero. 
Based upon the empirical study, the following 
conclusions can be made: 
First, Lintner' model was better fit for the U.S. 
owned Canadian subsidiaries than for the U.S. parent 
companies in terms of R-square. The dividend adjustment 
rate of Lintner's model was .50 for the Canadian 
subsidiaries which was greater than .21 of the U.S. 
parent companies. Higher adjustment rates of the U.S. 
owned foreign subsidiaries in Lintner's model seem to be 
related to the more stable dividend payment records in 
terms of smaller coefficient of variation for average 
payout ratio than the U.S. parent companies. That also 
means that the U.S. parent companies are very 
conservative in adjusting their dividends while the U.S 
owned foreign subsidiaries are aggressive in adjusting 
their dividends. Even though Lintner s model is still 
valid in the international setting, the explanatory power 
of Lintner's model is different under different regimes. 
Chow test showed very different parameter value of 
Lintner's equation during the periods of fixed exchange 
rates, compared to the periods of floating exchange 
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rates. Also, the magnitude of adjustment rate of 
dividends under fixed exchange rates was .72 which was 
much greater than .35 under floating exchange rates. 
This suggests that Canadian subsidiaries are more 
conservative in adjusting their dividends during the 
periods of floating exchange rates than during the 
periods of fixed exchange rates. Traditionally in 
Lintner's model the constant term has been postulated 
positive because managers are reluctant to cut dividends. 
But under floating exchange rates the constant term of 
Lintner's model has negative sign, implying that firms 
were ready to cut dividends. 
Second, the U.S. owned foreign subsidiaries do not 
seem to adjust their dividend payment to the changes in 
exchange rates. Hypothesis II asked whether there is 
additional variable to increase the explanatory power of 
Lintner's model under floating exchange rates. The 
statistical results did not support the alternative 
hypothesis that exchange rate is an important variable. 
Third, hypothesis III investigated whether there is 
another variable in Lintner's model given the different 
interest rates and inflation rates of the host country 
and U.S.. Only the regression coefficient of changes in 
the Canadian interest rates added to the adjustment 
equation in Lintner's model during the periods of 
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floating exchange rates showed significant difference 
from zero. Hence we can say that Lintner's model is 
misspecified during the periods of floating exchange 
rates and the changes in nominal interest rates of the 
host countries should be added to Lintner's partial 
adjustment model to better explain the dividend payment 
behavior of the U.S. owned foreign subsidiaries. 
VI-2 Implications for Future Research 
First, in this study annual accounting information 
was used. But in order to better investigate the 
influence of exchange rate on dividend policy of the U.S. 
owned foreign subsidiaries, quarterly accounting 
information would provide better results. The foreign 
subsidiaries alter their dividend payment on short term 
basis rather than on long term basis. 
Second, if more extensive data on U.S. owned foreign 
subsidiaries of U.S. parent companies can be obtained, a 
comparative study of the dividend policy may show how 
subsidiaries in one host country may pay dividends 
differently, compared to the subsidiaries in other 
countries. 
Third, different kind of accounting information, for 
example, the level of inventory, may be a better 
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indicator of how the dividend payment will be in the next 
period. The changes in the inventory would be more 
closely related to the changes in dividends than changes 
in earnings. The cash account would also be another 
candidate for this kind of approach to the dividend 
payment behavior of the U.S. owned foreign -subsidiaries. 
Fourth, more sophisticated models which combine the 
differential interest, inflation, and tax rates between 
U.S. and host countries could be developed. Because of 
multicollinearity in regression analysis among the 
exchange rates, interest rates, and inflation rates, 
this approach should solve at first the interrelationship 
among those independent variables. 
ENDNOTES 
1. The adjectives "multinational", "international", 
"global", "world wide", "supernational", and 
"transnational" are used interchangeable in this area. 
For the good reviews on multinational corporations, 
see Hymer (1960), Kindleberger (1969), Aharoni (1971), 
and Caves (1971) . 
2. According to Kopits (1976), the four distinguished 
characteristics of MNC are : international operations, 
collective transfer of resources, ownership with 
control, and cosmopolitan mentality. 
3. Examples of Financial Flows : 
Dividends 
Fees, royalties, corporate overhead costs. 
Interest and repayment of credit/loans. 
Equity Investment 
Loans 
Credit on goods and services 
4. Transfer price is the price at which one unit of a 
firm sells goods and/or services to an affiliated 
unit. The opposite concept to transfer price is arm's 
length price which is negotiated between unrelated 
parties. 
5. The reinvocing center, which is usually located in 
low-tax nations or a tax haven, takes title to all 
goods sold by one corporate unit to another affiliate 
or to a third party customer, although the goods move 
directly from the factory or warehouse location to the 
purchaser. The center pays the seller and, in turn, 
is paid by the purchasing unit. Tax authorities may 
be suspicious of the transactions with an affiliated 
trading company located in a tax haven. 
6. Leading and Lagging: Accelerating (leading) and 
delaying (lagging) the international payments by 
modifying credit terms, normally on trade between 
affiliates. Leading and lagging is a highly favored 
means of shifting liquidity between affiliates. 
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7. Intracorporate loans are legitimate transfer 
mechanisms of financing foreign operations and moving 
the funds internationally. The most important methods 
are direct loans, back-to-back financing, parallel 
loans, and currency swaps. Direct loans are straight 
extensions of credit from the parent to an affiliate 
or from one affiliate to another. Back-to-back 
financing is an intracorporate loan channeled through 
a bank. Parallel loans are the simultaneous borrowing 
and lending operations usually involving the four 
related parties in two different countries. Currency 
swap is a simultaneous borrowing and lending operation 
whereby two parties sell currencies to each other at 
the spot rate and undertake to reverse the exchange 
after a fixed term at a fixed exchange rate. 
8. Compensating balance : When a U.S. bank lends funds to 
a firm, it charges interest on the full amount of the 
loan and furthermore requires that a spicified amount 
of compensating balances be kept on deposit in the 
bank. This is in contrast to foreign banks, which 
generally lend on an overdraft basis with the firm 
paying full interest only on that portion drawn down 
plus a committment fee of perhaps .5 percent annually 
on the unusued balance. The U.S. dollar accounts held 
in the bank's branches for transaction purposes by the 
company's affiliates around the world can be used to 
satisfy this compensating balance requirement. For 
example, if subsidiary A increases its bank deposit, 
then additional funds can be released to the parent or 
other subsidiaries as their compensating balance 
requirements are correspondingly reduced. 
9. Debt versus equity investment : Multinationals 
generally prefer loans to equity for several reasons. 
First, parent company loans to foreign subsidiaries 
are often regarded as equivalent to equity investments 
both by host countries and local creditors. Second, 
dividends or reductions in equity are more closely 
controlled by government than interest and loan 
repayment. Third, interest paid on a loan is 
ordinarily tax deductible in the host country whereas 
dividend payments are not. However, firms do not have 
complete latitude in choosing their debt to equity 
ratios abroad. Some host governments might restrict a 
subsidiary's local borrowing to a certain percentage 
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of the parent's equity. 
10. Firms often have the option of selecting the 
currencies in which to invoice the interaffiliate 
transactions. The choice of invoicing currency has 
both tax and currency control implications. 
Tax effects : The particular currency in which the 
interaffiliate transactions are invoiced can affect 
after-tax profits if currency fluctuation is 
anticipated. 
Exchange controls : The choice of invoicing currency 
can also enable a firm to remove some blocked funds 
from a country that has currency controls. 
11. Some classes of investors might prefer dividends to 
capital gains. For example, some invididual investors 
may find it cheaper and easier to receive dividends 
than to sell or borrow again their shares. In 
endowment funds, only the dividend income may be 
spent. In certain trust funds, one beneficiary 
receives the dividend income instead of capital gains. 
Corporations usually pay higher taxes on realized 
capital gains than on dividend income because of the 
85% exclusion of dividends. 
12. In the 1950s, John Lintner conducted a series of 
interviews with the corporate managers about their 
dividend policies. Lintner's study determined that 
the selective firms appeared to have target payout 
ratios viewed in a long-term context. See, Lintner 
( 1956) . 
13. For this kind of empirical study on informational 
content of dividends, see Fama, Fisher, Jensen, and 
Roll (1969), and Copeland (1979). 
14. API(Abnormal Performance Index) measures abnormal 
performance of a certain model or market efficiency by 
deviations from the market model. 
15. Agency costs are the costs associated with monitoring 
management's actions to insure that these actions are 
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consistent with contractual agreements among 
management, stockholders, and debtholders, 
detail of agency costs, see Jensen and Meckl 
(1976 ) . 
For 
ing 
the 
16. Elton and Gruber (1970). 
17. Lewellen, Stanley, Lease, and Schlarbaum (1978). 
18. For an empirical study, see Mutti (1981). 
19. The marginal entrenchment hypothesis has been 
advocated by DeAngelo and Rice (1983). 
20. See Vermaelen (1981). 
21. Refer to footnote No. 12. 
22. Fama and Babiak (1968) also found that in applying the 
dividend models to the data of most firms, net income 
seemed to provide a better measure of profits than 
either cash flow or net income and depreciation 
included as separate variables in the model. 
23. Robbins and Stobaugh (1973). 
24. U.S. Department of Commerce (1979 and 1981). 
25. The formula for determining the amount of deemed paid 
tax is; 
Gross Dividend 
- x Foreign Tax 
Net Income 
In this example, 
18.72 
52.00 
x 48 = $ 17.72 
Relevant material: Price Waterhouse (1976). 
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26. For this part, see Kopits (1976). 
27. Under the Subpart F Income provisions of the U.S. 
International Revenue Code, introduced by the Revenue 
Act of 1962 and substantially reinforced by the Tax 
Reduction Act of 1975. 
28. The translation methods are ; 
1) the current / non current method prescribes the 
translation of long-term assets and equities at 
historical rates whereas short-term assets and 
liabilities are translated at the exchange rate in 
effect on the data of balance sheet. 
2) The monetary / non monetary method differentiates 
between monetary assets and liabilities, those items 
that represent a claim to receive, or an obligation 
to pay, a fixed amount of foreign currency units, and 
non monetary, or physical, assets and liabilities. 
Monetary items (e.g., cash, accounts payable and 
receivable, and long-term debt) are translated at the 
current rate ; non monetary items (e.g., inventory 
and fixed assets) are translated at historical rates. 
3) Temporal method appears to be a modified version 
of the monetary / non monetary method, the only 
difference being that, under the monetary / non 
monetary method, inventory is always translated at 
the historical rates. 
4) Current method: Balance sheet items are 
translated at the current rates, and income statement 
items are at the annual average spot rates except 
common stocks. 
29. For example, see Biel (1976), Evans (1976), and Shank 
(1976) 
30. For empirical tests of The Internaional Fisher Effect, 
see Giddy and Dufey (1975), and Aliber and Stickney 
(1975). 
31. Refer to footnote No. 12. 
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32. For a good survey of the literature in this area, see 
Johnston ( 1984 ) . 
33. Specifically, the dividends received by parent company 
from foreign subsidiary consist of gross dividends 
(net dividends received plus withholding tax) and 
deemed paid tax which is the portion of foreign tax 
amount paid in proportion to the gross dividends out 
of net income; in other words, foreign tax amounts x 
(gross dividends / net income). 
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TABLE 23 
U.S. Subsidiaries 
in Canada 
U.S. • Average Standard Period 
Parent Canadian Equity Deviation 
Company Subsidiary Control 
★ 
Celanese Celanese 57.00% 0.00% 1964-82 
Conoco Hud.Bay Oil&Gas 57.59 6.40 1964-80 
Cr.Cork & Seal Cr.Cork & Seal 70.00 0.00 1964-75 
Dana Hayes Dana 61.63 3.73 1964-82 
Exxon Imperial Oil 70.00 0.00 1964-82 
Gene'l Dynami. Asbestos 55.00 0.00 1969-82 
Gulf Gulf 66.63 3.04 1964-82 
Scott Scott 54.58 0.84 1964-82 
Sears Simpson Sears 50.00 0.00 1964-82 
Sher. Williams Sherwin Will. 66.65 3.32 1964-80 
Superior Oil Superior Oil 53.00 0.00 1964-78 
Wamaco Wamaco 70.00 0.00 1975-82 
Champion Int'1 Weldwood 74.00 0.00 1970-82 
Cr.Zellerbach Cr.Zellerbach 97.65 3.30 1964-80 
Ford Ford 85.32 3.64 1964-82 
Fruehauf Kelsey Hayes 73.00 0.00 1964-82 
Fruehauf Fruehauf 91.00 0.00 1964-82 
GE GE 92.00 0.00 1964-82 
GF GF 100.00 0.00 1974-80 
Goodyear Goodyear 83.95 3.75 1964-82 
Kraft Dominion Dairies 83.53 1.01 1964-80 
Murphy Oil Murphy Oil 77.00 0.00 1970-82 
Occi. Bet. Occidental Pet. 75.82 11.48 1966-82 
Safeway Safeway 100.00 0.00 1964-82 
Teledyne Teledyne 77.00 0.00 1974-82 
Texaco Texaco 73.79 9.95 1964-82 
Union Carb. Union Carb. 75.00 0.00 1964-82 
Union Oil Union Oil 87.00 0.00 1975-82 
Westinghouse Westinghouse 80.42 10.00 1964-82 
* Average control during the period 
TABLE 24 
Correlation Between U.S. Parent s Payout 
Ratio and Canadian Subsidiary's Payout 
U.S. 
Parent Canadian 
Company Subsidiary 
Celanese Celanese 
Conoco Hud.Bay Oil&Gas 
Cr.Cork & Seal Cr.Cork & Seal 
Dana Hayes Dana 
Exxon Imperial Oil 
Gene'l Dynam. Asbestos 
Gulf Gulf 
Scott Scott 
Sears Simpson Sears 
Sher. Williams Sherwin Willi. 
Superior Oil Superior Oil 
Wamaco Wamaco 
Champion Int'l Weldwood 
Cr.Zellerbach Cr.Zellerbach 
Ford Ford 
Fruehauf Kelsey Hayes 
Fruehauf Fruehauf 
GE GE 
GF GF 
Goodyear Goodyear 
Kraft Dominion Dairies 
Murphy Oil Murphy Oil 
Occi. Pet. Occidental Pet. 
Safeway Safeway 
Teledyne Teledyne 
Texaco Texaco 
Union Carb. Union Carb. 
Union Oil Union Oil 
Westinghouse Westinghouse 
Total 29 Companies (n=418) 
Average Correlation Period 
Equity 
Control 
★ 
57.00% 0.41 1964-82 
57.59 0.73 1964-80 
70.00 0.00 1964-75 
61.63 0.78 1964-82 
70.00 0.85 1964-82 
55.00 0.09 1969-82 
66.63 0.20 1964-82 
54.58 0.62 1964-82 
50.00 0.14 1964-82 
66.65 0.44 1964-80 
53.00 0.00 1964-78 
70.00 -0.51 1975-82 
74.00 0.00 1970-82 
97.65 0.49 1964-80 
85.32 -0.05 1964-82 
73.00 -0.15 1964-82 
91.00 0.16 1964-82 
92.00 0.40 1964-82 
100.00 -0.27 1974-80 
83.95 -0.15 1964-82 
83.53 -0.68 1964-80 
77.00 0.00 1970-82 
75.82 0.32 1966-82 
100.00 -0.04 1964-82 
77.00 0.00 1974-82 
73.79 0.52 1964-82 
75.00 0.36 1964-82 
87.00 0.06 1975-82 
80.42 -0.23 1964-82 
0.04 
★ Average control during the period 
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TABLE 25 
Comparison of Correlation 
Between EPS and DPS 
of Canadian Subsidiaries 
Correlation between 
EPS and DPS 
Equity Period Canadian U.S. 
Control 
★ 
Subsidiary Parent 
Celanese 57.00% 1964-82 0.49 0.13 
Conoco 57.59 1964-80 0.99 0.39 
Cr.Cork & Seal 70.00 1964-75 N.A. 0.00 
Dana 61.63 1964-82 0.41 0.46 
Exxon 70.00 1964-82 0.67 0.90 
Gene'l Dynamics 55.00 1969-82 0.63 -0.08 
Gulf 66.63 1964-82 0.71 0.72 
Scott 54.58 1964-82 0.78 0.17 
Sears 50.00 1964-82 0.84 0.73 
SherwinWilliams 66.65 1964-80 0.62 0.34 
Superior Oil 53.00 1964-78 0.00 0.74 
Warnaco 70.00 1975-82 -0.21 0.14 
Champion Int'l 74.00 1970-82 0.51 0.43 
Cr. Zellerbach 97.65 1964-80 0.27 0.51 
Ford 85.32 1964-82 0.74 0.63 
Kelsey Hayes 73.00 1964-82 0.80 0.40 
Fruehauf 91.00 1964-82 0.56 0.40 
GE 92.00 1964-82 0.92 0.74 
GF 100.00 1974-80 0.94 0.93 
Goodyear 83.95 1964-82 0.55 0.54 
Kraft 83.53 1964-80 0.54 0.89 
Murphy Oil 77.00 1970-82 0.00 0.55 
Occidental Pet. 75.82 1966-82 0.84 0.41 
Safeway 100.00 1964-82 N.A. 0.89 
Teledyne 77.00 1974-82 0.44 0.00 
Texaco 73.79 1964-82 0.63 0.69 
Union Carb. 75.00 1964-82 0.84 0.61 
Union Oil 87.00 1975-80 -0.90 0.97 
Westinghouse 80.42 1964-82 0.87 0.71 
* Average control during the period 
N.A.^Constant DPS during the whole period 
I 
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TABLE 26 
Comparison of Average Payout Ratio 
(Dividend/Net Incane) 
Canadian U.S. 
Subsidiaries Parent 
Equity Period Average Standard Average Standard 
Control 
* 
Celanese 57.00% 1964-82 
Conoco 57.59 1964-80 
Cr.Cork & Seal 70.00 1964-75 
Dana 61.63 1964-82 
Exxon 70.00 1964-82 
Gene'l Dynamics 55.00 1969-82 
Gulf 66.63 1964-82 
Scott 54.58 1964-82 
Sears 50.00 1964-82 
SherwinWil lams 66.65 1964-80 
Superior Oil 53.00 1964-78 
Wamaco 70.00 1975-82 
Champion Int'l 74.00 1970-82 
Cr.Zellerbach 97.65 1964-80 
Ford 85.32 1964-82 
Kelsey Hayes 73.00 1964-82 
Fruehauf 91.00 1964-82 
GE 92.00 1964-82 
GF 100.00 1974-80 
Goodyear 83.95 1964-82 
Kraft 83.53 1964-80 
Murphy Oil 77.00 1970-82 
Occidental Pet. 75.82 1966-82 
Safeway 100.00 1964-82 
Teledyne 77.00 1974-82 
Texaco 73.79 1964-82 
Union Carb. 75.00 1964-82 
Union Oil 87.00 1975-80 
Westinghouse 80.42 1964-82 
Total 29Canpanies(n=418) 
Payout deviation Payout deviation 
Ratio Ratio 
21.24% 28.81% 22.54% 64.29% 
37.02 6.34 40.23 12.67 
18.97 7.43 0.00 0.00 
54.85 31.86 43.93 14.77 
53.78 16.21 54.98 10.65 
34.74 39.33 43.00 70.84 
41.67 15.51 50.28 27.23 
38.03 10.64 49.49 21.99 
46.88 9.02 49.69 8.89 
23.90 22.41 36.06 42.37 
0.00 0.00 20.06 63.14 
34.32 7.71 110.68 287.92 
27.75 38.16 46.24 22.61 
67.17 57.64 56.72 16.75 
60.45 76.18 48.26 68.78 
27.37 24.14 53.86 34.46 
29.62 13.70 53.86 34.46 
41.25 9.02 55.05 14.35 
38.36 6.47 48.87 11.80 
29.12 75.65 42.49 9.06 
50.01 19.78 50.35 7.66 
0.00 0.00 18.43 6.60 
17.62 12.78 100.01 311.96 
0.57 0.35 48.00 7.26 
90.76 68.07 0.00 0.00 
32.76 9.91 49.74 12.07 
37.84 23.84 52.52 17.54 
33.80 17.56 25.28 3.03 
30.17 15.68 56.48 60.38 
36.57 34.07 50.94 81.25 
* Average control during the period 
TABLE 27 
Comparison of Coefficient 
of Variation in Payout Ratio (*) 
Coefficient of Variation 
in Payout Ratio 
Equity Period Canadian U.S. 
Control Subsidiary Parent 
** 
Celanese 
Conoco 
Cr.Cork & Seal 
Dana 
Gulf 
Scott 
Sears 
Sherwin Willi. 
Superior Oil 
Wamaco 
Champion Int"1 
Cr.Zellerbach 
Ford 
Kelsey Hayes 
Fruehauf 
GE 
GF 
Goodyear 
Kraft 
Murphy Oil 
Occidental Pet 
Safeway 
Teledyne 
Texaco 
Union Carb. 
Union Oil 
Westinghouse 
57.00% 1964-82 
57.59 1964-80 
70.00 1964-75 
61.63 1964-82 
70.00 1964-82 
1969-82 
66.63 1964-82 
54.58 1964-82 
50.00 1964-82 
66.65 1964-80 
53.00 1964-78 
70.00 1975-82 
74.00 1970-82 
97.65 1964-80 
85.32 1964-82 
73.00 1964-82 
91.00 1964-82 
92.00 1964-82 
100.00 1974-80 
83.95 1964-82 
83.53 1964-80 
77.00 1970-82 
75.82 1966-82 
100.00 1964-82 
77.00 1974-82 
73.97 1964-82 
75.00 1964-82 
87.00 1975-80 
80.42 1964-82 
1.36 2.85 
0.17 0.31 
0.39 0.00 
0.58 0.34 
0.30 0.19 
1.13 2.58 
0.37 0.54 
0.28 0.44 
0.19 0.18 
0.94 1.17 
0.00 3.15 
0.22 2.60 
1.38 0.49 
0.86 0.30 
1.26 1.43 
0.88 0.64 
0.46 0.64 
0.22 0.26 
0.17 0.24 
2.60 0.21 
0.40 0.15 
0.00 0.36 
0.73 3.12 
0.61 0.15 
0.75 0.00 
0.30 0.24 
0.63 0.33 
0.52 0.12 
0.52 1.07 
Exxon 
Gene'l Dynamics 55.00 
Total 29Companies(n=418) 0.93 1.60 
* Coefficient of Variationstandard deviation/Average Payout 
** Average control during the period 
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TABLE 28 
Canadian Subsidiary's Payout Ratio 
Under Fixed Exchange and Floating 
Exchange Rates 
Under Fixed Under Floating 
Exchange Rates Exchange Rates 
(1964-1972) (1973-1982) 
Canadian Equity Period Average Standard Average Standard 
Subsidiary Control Payout deviation Payout deviation 
★ Ratio Ratio 
Celanese 57.00% 1964-82 32.00% 26.72% 11.56% 28.38% 
Hud.Bay Oil&Gas 57.59 1964-80 41.61 4.94 31.86 2.53 
Cr.Cork & Seal 70.00 1964-75 21.77 6.26 10.55 2.35 
Hayes Dana 61.63 1964-82 59.07 20.54 51.05 40.27 
Imperial Oil 70.00 1964-82 65.45 7.07 43.27 14.91 
Asbestos 55.00 1969-82 57.31 23.63 25.72 41.61 
Gulf 66.63 1964-82 55.57 7.46 29.15 8.00 
Scott 54.58 1964-82 47.55 6.47 29.47 4.17 
Simpson Sears 50.00 1964-82 46.51 6.60 47.20 11.13 
Sherwin Willi. 66.65 1964-80 29.28 19.02 17.86 25.61 
Superior Oil 53.00 1964-78 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Warnaco 70.00 1975-82 N.A. N.A. 34.32 7.71 
Weldwood 74.00 1970-82 27.61 68.30 27.79 30.08 
Cr.Zellerbach 97.65 1964-80 93.04 69.12 38.05 17.44 
Ford 85.32 1964-82 41.18 29.34 77.79 100.68 
Kelsey Hayes 73.00 1964-82 32.92 33.79 22.37 9.56 
Fruehauf 91.00 1964-82 34.41 16.69 25.40 9.28 
GE 92.00 1964-82 46.78 9.68 36.28 4.66 
GF 100.00 1974-80 N.A. N.A. 38.36 6.47 
Goodyear 83.95 1964-82 56.60 94.15 4.39 46.18 
Dominion Dairies 83.53 1964-80 35.07 9.89 66.82 13.13 
Murphy Oil 77.00 1970-82 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Occidental Pet. 75.82 1966-82 17.32 16.67 17.83 10.24 
Safeway 100.00 1964-82 0.89 .2 0.28 0.12 
Teledyne 77.00 1974-82 N.A. N.A. 90.76 68.07 
Texaco 73.79 1964-82 35.35 7.18 30.42 11.74 
Union Carb. 75.00 1964-82 55.34 6.28 28.80 11.87 
Union Oil 87.00 1975-80 N.A. N.A. 33.80 17.56 
Westinghouse 80.42 1964-82 37.31 17.88 23.74 10.50 
Total 29Companies (n=170) 43.49 34.63 
(n=233) 31.07 32.66 
* Average control during the period 
N.A.=Not Available 
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TABLE 29 
Coefficient of Variation!* **) of 
Canadian Subsidiary's Payout Ratio 
Under Fixed Exchange and Floating 
Exchange Rates 
Under Fixed Under Floating 
Exchange Rates Exchange Rates 
(1964-1972) (1973-1982) 
Canadian Equity Period 
Subsidiary Control Coefficient Coefficient 
** of of 
Variation Variation 
Celanese 57.00% 1964-82 0.84 2.46 
Hud.Bay Oil&Gas 57.59 1964-80 0.12 0.08 
Cr.Cork & Seal 70.00 1964-75 0.29 0.22 
Hayes Dana 61.63 1964-82 0.35 0.79 
Imperial Oil 70.00 1964-82 0.11 0.34 
Asbestos 55.00 1969-82 0.41 1.62 
Gulf 66.63 1964-82 0.13 0.27 
Scott 54.58 1964-82 0.14 0.14 
Simpson Sears 50.00 1964-82 0.14 0.24 
SherwinWil1iams 66.65 1964-80 0.65 1.43 
Superior Oil 53.00 1964-78 N.A. N.A. 
Wamaco 70.00 1975-82 N.A. 0.22 
Weldwood 74.00 1970-82 2.47 1.08 
Cr.Zellerbach 97.65 1964-80 0.74 0.46 
Ford 85.32 1964-82 0.71 1.29 
Kelsey Hayes 73.00 1964-82 1.03 0.43 
Fruehauf 91.00 1964-82 0.49 0.37 
GE 92.00 1964-82 0.21 0.13 
GF 100.00 1974-80 N.A. 0.17 
Goodyear 83.95 1964-82 1.66 10.52 
Dominion Dairies 83.53 1964-80 0.28 0.20 
Murphy Oil 77.00 1970-82 N.A. N.A. 
Occidental Pat. 75.82 1966-82 0.96 0.57 
Safeway 100.00 1964-82 0.22 0.43 
Teledyne 77.00 1974-82 N.A. 0.75 
Texaco 73.79 1964-82 0.20 0.39 
Union Carb. 75.00 1964-82 0.11 0.41 
Union Oil 87.00 1975-80 N.A. 0.52 
Westinghouse 80.42 1964-82 0.48 0.44 
Total 29Ccmpanies(n=173) 0.80 
1.05 (n=233) 
* Coefficient of Variation=Standard Deviation/Average Payout Ratio 
** Average control during the period 
N.A.=Not Available 
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TABLE 30 
Correlation Between U.S. Parent's Payout 
Ratio and Canadian Subsidiary's Payout 
(Payout Ratio including Depreciation) 
U.S. Average Correlation Period 
Parent Canadian Equity 
Company Subsidiary Control 
* 
Celanese Celanese 57.00% -0.01 1964-82 
Conoco Hud.Bay Oil&Gas 57.59 0.49 1964-80 
Cr.Cork & Seal Cr.Cork & Seal 70.00 0.00 1964-75 
Dana Hayes Dana 61.63 0.72 1964-82 
Exxon Imperial Oil 70.00 0.81 1964-82 
Gene '1 Dynami. Asbestos 55.00 0.14 1969-82 
Gulf Gulf 66.63 0.50 1964-82 
Scott Scott 54.58 0.85 1964-82 
Sears Simpson Sears 50.00 0.24 1964-82 
Sherwin Willi. Sher. Williams 66.65 0.13 1964-80 
Superior Oil Superior Oil 53.00 0.00 1964-78 
Wamaco Wamaco 70.00 NA 1975-82 
Champion Int'l Weldwood 74.00 0.00 1970-82 
Cr.Zellerbach Cr.Zellerbach 97.65 0.30 1964-80 
Ford Ford 85.32 -0.29 1964-82 
Fruehauf Kelsey Hayes 73.00 -0.08 1970-82 
Fruehauf Fruehauf 91.00 -0.03 1964-82 
GE GE 92.00 0.12 1964-82 
GF GF 100.00 -0.32 1974-80 
Goodyear Goodyear 83.95 0.18 1964-78 
Kraft Doninion Dairies 83.53 -0.69 1964-69 
Murphy Oil Murphy Oil 77.00 0.00 1970-82 
Occi. Pet. Occidental Pet. 75.82 0.00 1966-82 
Safeway Safeway 100.00 0.68 1970-82 
Teledyne Teledyne 77.00 0.00 1974-82 
Texaco Texaco 73.79 0.21 1964-82 
Union Carb. Union Carb. 75.00 0.94 1964-82 
Union Oil Union Oil 87.00 0.37 1975-82 
Westinghouse Westinghouse 80.42 -0.36 1964-82 
Total 29Companies(n=383) 0.28 
* Average control during the period 
NA=Not Available 
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TABLE 31 
Comparison of Payout Ratio including 
Depreciation (Dividend/(Net Inccme+Depreciation)) 
Equity Period 
Control 
Celanese 
★ 
57.00% 1964-82 
Conoco 57.59 1964-75 
Cr.Cork & Seal 70.00 1964-75 
Dana 61.63 1964-82 
Exxon 70.00 1964-82 
Gene'l Dynamics 55.00 1969-82 
Gulf 66.63 1964-82 
Scott 54.58 1964-82 
Sears 50.00 1964-82 
SherwinWilliams 66.65 1964-80 
Superior Oil 53.00 1964-78 
Wamaco 70.00 1975-82 
Champion Int'l 74.00 1970-82 
Cr.Zellerbach 97.65 1964-80 
Ford 85.32 1964-82 
Kelsey Hayes 73.00 1970-82 
Fruehauf 91.00 1964-82 
GE 92.00 1964-82 
GF 100.00 1974-80 
Goodyear 83.95 1964-78 
Kraft 83.53 1964-69 
Murphy Oil 77.00 1970-82 
Occidental Pet. 75.82 1966-82 
Safeway 100.00 1970-82 
Teledyne 77.00 1974-82 
Texaco 73.79 1964-82 
Union Carb. 75.00 1964-82 
Union Oil 87.00 1975-80 
Westinghouse 80.42 1964-82 
Total 29Companies(n=383) 
Canadian U.S. 
Subsidiaries Parent 
Average Standard Average Standard 
Payout deviation 
Ratio 
Payout deviation 
Ratio 
12.89% 11.75% 17.27% 5.90% 
25.22 2.19 21.53 5.14 
12.49 5.78 0.00 0.00 
26.91 8.26 29.22 7.37 
35.93 7.68 33.83 4.82 
14.95 12.56 6.02 7.71 
22.59 4.78 24.90 5.35 
20.20 5.80 26.34 10.78 
30.29 4.74 38.64 4.84 
13.50 11.94 34.40 21.90 
0.00 0.00 14.83 9.04 
NA NA 14.07 22.52 
17.11 13.87 20.60 13.33 
28.18 17.64 28.74 6.98 
18.46 13.88 20.52 14.36 
14.78 7.87 23.79 5.14 
19.84 8.06 22.69 4.81 
24.35 3.98 33.32 6.71 
27.11 4.53 34.45 6.14 
10.87 6.87 21.98 1.70 
16.36 2.94 36.52 2.17 
0.00 0.00 7.75 1.72 
12.07 9.43 18.72 15.76 
0.23 0.12 22.18 2.81 
41.97 9.17 0.00 0.00 
21.85 5.20 30.92 5.98 
22.36 7.12 25.70 4.99 
24.94 11.86 13.74 1.04 
16.78 5.92 28.54 8.40 
20.19 11.39 25.81 11.01 
* Average control during the period 
NA=Not Available 
TABLE 32 
Comparison of Coefficient of Variation(*) 
in Payout Ratio including Depreciation 
Coefficient of Variation 
in Payout Ratio 
Equity Period Canadian U.S. 
Control Subsidiary Parent 
** 
Celanese 
Conoco 
Cr.Cork & Seal 
Dana 
Gulf 
Scott 
Sears 
Sherwin Willi. 
Superior Oil 
Wamaco 
Champion Int'l 
Cr.Zellerbach 
Ford 
Kelsey Hayes 
Fruehauf 
GE 
GF 
Goodyear 
Kraft 
Murphy Oil 
Occidental Pet 
Safevay 
Teledyne 
Texaco 
Union Carb. 
Union Oil 
Westinghouse 
57.00% 1964-82 
57.59 1964-80 
70.00 1964-75 
61.63 1964-82 
70.00 1964-82 
1969-82 
66.63 1964-82 
54.58 1964-82 
50.00 1964-82 
66.65 1964-80 
53.00 1964-78 
70.00 1975-82 
74.00 1970-82 
97.65 1964-80 
85.32 1964-82 
73.00 1970-82 
91.00 1964-82 
92.00 1964-82 
100.00 1974-80 
83.95 1964-78 
83.53 1964-69 
77.00 1970-82 
75.82 1966-82 
100.00 1970-82 
77.00 1974-81 
73.79 1964-82 
75.00 1964-82 
87.00 1975-80 
80.42 1964-82 
0.91 0.34 
0.08 0.23 
0.17 0.00 
0.31 0.25 
0.21 0.14 
0.84 1.28 
0.21 0.21 
0.29 0.41 
0.16 0.13 
0.88 0.63 
0.00 0.61 
NA NA 
0.81 0.25 
0.62 0.24 
0.75 0.70 
0.53 0.22 
0.41 0.21 
0.16 0.20 
0.17 0.18 
0.63 0.07 
0.18 0.06 
0.00 0.22 
0.78 0.84 
0.52 0.12 
0.22 0.00 
0.24 0.19 
0.32 0.19 
0.48 0.08 
0.35 0.29 
Exxon 
Gene'l Dynamics 55.00 
Total 29Ccmpanies(n=383) 0.56 0.43 
* Coefficient of Variation=Standard deviation/Average payout 
** Average control during the period 
NA=Not Available 
TABLE 33 
U.S. Subsidiaries 
in Other Countries 
Company Host • 
Country 
Average 
Equity 
Control 
•k 
Standrad 
Deviation 
Period 
Ford Belgium 74.47 11.24 1964-81 
Anderson Clayton Brazil 100.00 0.00 1979-82 
Ford Brazil 89.00 0.00 1979-81 
Ford Denmark 71.87 9.03 1964-82 
Ford Finland 71.48 2.13 1964-80 
Adam Opel(GM) Germany 100.00 0.00 1978-81 
Texaco Germany 100.00 0.00 1979-82 
Standard Elektek 
(ITT) 
Germany 86.00 0.00 1979-81 
Celanese Mexico 40.00 0.00 1979-80 
Goodrich Mexico 35.00 0.00 1979-82 
Kimberly Clark Mexico 40.00 0.00 1979-81 
Union Carbide Mexico 45.70 0.00 1978-82 
Ford Netherland 88.19 11.07 1964-80 
Ford Sweden 85.06 10.22 1964-81 
Dana U.K. 69.00 0.00 1979-80 
Woolworth U.K. 52.70 0.00 1964-82 
Heinz U.K. 100.00 0.00 1979-82 
Esso (Exxon) U.K. 100.00 0.00 1978-82 
IBM U.K. 100.00 0.00 1979-80 
* Average control during the period 
TABLE 34 
Correlation between U.S. Parent's 
Payout Ratio and Non-Canadian 
Susidiaries' Payout Ratio 
Company Host 
Country 
Average Period 
Equity 
Control 
* 
Correlation 
Ford Belgium 74.47 1964-81 0.29 
Anderson Clayton Brazil 100.00 1979-82 0.54 
Ford Brazil 89.00 1979-81 0.35 
Ford Denmark 71.87 1964-82 0.08 
Ford Finland 71.48 1964-80 -0.07 
Adam Opel(GM) Germany 100.00 1978-81 -0.01 
Texaco Germany 100.00 1979-82 -0.63 
Standard Elektek Germany 
(ITT) 
86.00 1979-81 -0.50 
Celanese Mexico 40.00 1979-80 N.A 
Goodrich Mexico 35.00 1979-82 -0.50 
Kimberly Clark Mexico 40.00 1979-81 0.79 
Union Carbide Mexico 45.70 1978-82 -0.45 
Ford Netherland 88.19 1964-80 0.06 
Dana U.K. 69.00 1979-80 N.A. 
Woolworth U.K. 52.70 1964-82 0.35 
Heinz U.K. 100.00 1979-82 0.89 
Esso (Exxon) U.K. 100.00 1978-82 0.85 
IBM U.K. 100.00 1979-80 N.A 
Total 18 Companies (n=130) 0.16 
* Average control during the period 
NA = Not Available 
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TABLE 35 
Average Payout Ratio of 
U.S. Subsidiaries 
in Other Countries 
U.S. 
Subsidiaries 
U.S. 
Parents 
Company Host Period Average Standard Average Standard 
Country Payout Deviation Payout Deviation 
Ratio Ratio 
Ford Belgium 1964-81 71.80 40.70 50.94 69.75 
Anderson Clayton Brazil 1979-82 111.73 60.17 28.55 .54 
Ford Brazil 1979-81 78.12 33.50 2.04 33.04 
Ford Denmark 1964-82 15.63 33.17 48.26 68.78 
Ford Finland 1964-80 77.64 37.52 54.74 69.65 
Adam Opel (GM) Germany 1978-81 84.54 24.92 50.92 134.00 
Texaco Germany 1979-82 83.64 11.34 37.66 15.87 
Standard Elektek Germany 1979-81 140.99 100.71 58.14 26.00 
Celanese Mexico 1979-80 25.76 6.82 36.45 6.41 
Goodrich Mexico 1979-82 17.97 7.54 2.90 58.51 
Kimberly Clark Mexico 1979-81 13.57 2.03 33.91 10.81 
Union Carbide Mexico 1978-82 19.76 3.95 45.84 21.94 
Ford Netherlands 64-80 42.64 86.85 54.74 69.65 
Ford Sweden 1964-81 NA NA 50.94 69.75 
Dana U.K. 1979-80 21.44 .25 42.46 19.70 
Woolworth U.K. 1964-82 81.35 24.35 43.23 10.22 
Heinz U.K. 1979-82 54.44 22.96 35.73 1.98 
Esso (Exxon) U.K. 1978-82 88.10 51.71 50.63 8.79 
IBM U.K. 1979-80 56.01 7.54 54.57 6.43 
Total 19 Companies (n=130) 59.59 53.85 46.05 56.86 
NA = Not Available 
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TABLE 36 
Coefficient of Variation in 
Average Payout Ratio of 
U.S. Subsidiaries 
in Other Countries 
U.S. U.S. 
Subsidiaries Parents 
Company Host 
Country 
Average Period 
Equity 
Control 
* 
Coefficient of 
Variation 
Coefficient of 
Variation 
Ford Belgium 74.47 1964-81 0.57 1.37 
Anderson Clayton Brazil 100.00 1979-82 0.54 0.02 
Ford Brazil 89.00 1979-81 0.43 16.22 
Ford Denmark 71.87 1964-82 2.12 1.43 
Ford Finland 71.48 1964-80 0.48 1.28 
Adam Opel(GM) Germany 100.00 1978-81 0.28 2.63 
Texaco Germany 100.00 1979-82 0.14 0.42 
Standard Elektek Germany 86.00 1979-81 0.71 0.44 
Celanese Mexico 40.00 1979-80 0.26 0.16 
Goodrich Mexico 35.00 1979-82 0.42 20.21 
Kimberly Clark Mexico 40.00 1979-81 0.15 0.32 
Union Carbide Mexico 45.70 1978-82 0.20 0.48 
Ford Netherland 88.19 1964-80 2.04 1.28 
Ford Sweden 85.06 1964-81 NA 1.37 
Dana U.K. 69.00 1979-80 0.01 0.47 
Woolworth U.K. 52.70 1964-82 0.30 0.24 
Heinz U.K. 100.00 1979-82 0.42 0.06 
Esso (Exxon) U.K. 100.00 1978-82 0.59 0.17 
IBM U.K. 100.00 1979-80 0.13 0.12 
Total 19 Companies (n=130) 0.90 1.23 
* Average control during the period 
NA = Not Available 
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TABLE 37 
Average Payout Ratio of 
U.S. Subsidiaries 
in Other Countries 
Under Fixed Exchange Rates 
and Floating Exchange Rates 
Company Host Average Period Average Standard Coefficient 
Fixed Exchange 
Country Equity 
Control 
* 
Payout 
Ratio 
Deviation of 
Variation 
Rate (1964-72) 
Woolworth U.K. 52.70% 1964-72 84.05% 9.58% 0.11 
Ford Belgium 74.58 1964-72 72.61 25.41 0.35 
Ford Denmark 70.89 1964-72 26.59 18.97 0.71 
Ford Finland 73.00 1964-72 64.56 37.24 0.58 
Ford Netherland 82.40 1964-72 48.33 114.54 2.37 
All 5 Companies (n=45) 59.23 56.99 0.96 
Floating Exchange 
Rate (1973-82) 
Celanese Mexico 40.00% 1979-80 25.76% 6.82% 0.26 
Goodrich Mexico 35.00 1979-82 17.97 7.54 0.42 
Kimberly Clark Mexico 40.00 1979-81 13.57 2.03 0.15 
Union Carbide Mexico 45.70 1978-82 19.76 3.95 0.20 
Anderson Clayton Brazil 100.00 1979-82 111.73 60.17 0.54 
Ford Brazil 89.00 1979-81 78.12 33.50 0.43 
Adam Opel(GM) Germany 100.00 1978-81 87.54 24.92 0.28 
Texaco Germany 100.00 1979-82 83.64 11.34 0.14 
Standard Elektek Germany 86.00 1979-81 140.99 100.71 0.71 
(ITT) 
Dana U.K. 69.00 1979-80 21.44 0.25 0.01 
Woolworth U.K. 52.70 1973-81 78.73 33.94 0.43 
Heinz U.K. 100.00 1979-82 54.44 22.96 0.42 
Esso (Exxon) U.K. 100.00 1978-82 88.10 51.71 0.59 
IBM U.K. 100.00 1979-80 56.01 7.54 0.13 
Ford Belgium 74.47 1973-81 70.99 53.60 0.76 
Ford Denmark 71.87 1973-82 5.76 40.65 7.06 
Ford Finland 71.48 1973-80 92.35 34.15 0.37 
Ford Netherland 88.19 1973-80 36.24 46.45 1.28 
All 18 Companies (n=85) 59.78 52.46 0.88 
Total 23Canpanies(n=130) 59.59 53.85 0.90 
* Average control during the period 
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TABLE 38 
Basic Statistics 
of Canada and U.S. 
Canada U.S. 
Year End of Average Consumer Average Consumer 
Period Interest Price Interest Price 
Exchange 
Rate 
Rate Index Rate Index 
(1) (2) (3) (2) (3) 
1964 1.0741 3.74 102.0 3.55 101.3 
1965 1.0750 3.97 104.0 3.95 103.0 
1966 1.0838 5.00 108.0 4.88 106.0 
1967 1.0809 4.60 112.0 4.33 109.0 
1968 1.0728 6.25 117.0 5.35 113.6 
1969 1.0731 7.17 122.0 6.69 119.7 
1970 1.0442 5.99 125.9(70 .2) 6.44 126.8 
1971 1.0098 3.56 72.2 4.34 132.3(75) 
1972 0.9899 3.56 75.7 4.07 77.7 
1973 1.0001 5.47 81.4 7.03 82.6 
1974 0.9780 7.83 90.3 7.87 91.6 
1975 1.0170 7.40 100.0 5.87 100.0 
1976 0.9860 8.87 107.5 4.99 105.8 
1977 1.0635 7.33 116.1 5.27 112.7 
1978 1.1407 8.67 126.5 7.22 121.2 
1979 1.1714 11.68 138.1 10.04 134.9 
1980 1.1693 12.80 152.1 11.62 153.1 
1981 1.1989 17.72 171.0 14.08 169.0 
1982 1.2337 13.64 189.5 10.72 179.4 
(Source: IMF; International Financial Statistics) 
(1) Period Average in units of Canadian dollars per U.S. dollar 
(2) Period Average Treasury Bill Rate 
(3) Basis 100 in 1963 during 1964-70, 100 in 1975 during 1971-82 


